This indicates that the application does not enforce authorization checks on the audit log resource based on the user's current permissions. As a result, a user whose mailbox access has been revoked can continue to access historical audit logs related to that mailbox.
CVSS v3.1 → Score: 4.3 (Medium)

Note: If the audit logs expose sensitive mailbox configuration or confidential information, the severity may be higher.

Steps to Reproduce 1- Login with User A.
2- Invite User B as an Administrator with mailbox management permissions.
3- Login as User B.
4- Navigate to the mailbox settings and make any configuration change.
5- Verify that an audit log entry is created for the action.
6- Login as User A and revoke User B's mailbox permissions.
7- Confirm that the mailbox section is no longer accessible through the UI for User B.
8- Login again as User B.
9- Intercept the request used to retrieve an audit log (or directly access the audit log endpoint).
10- Replace the current log ID with the previously generated mailbox audit log ID.
11- Send the request.

Actual Behaviour → Even after mailbox permissions have been revoked, the server returns the historical mailbox audit log when the user directly requests it using the known log ID.

Expected Behaviour → Once mailbox permissions are revoked, the server should validate the user's current authorization before returning any mailbox-related audit logs. Unauthorized users should receive 403 Forbidden (or an equivalent authorization error).

Impact → Users can continue accessing mailbox-related audit logs after losing mailbox permissions.
→ Authorization is enforced only in the UI, not on the backend resource.
→ Historical mailbox activity remains accessible despite permission revocation.

Business Impact → Violates the principle of least privilege.
→ Former administrators or users with revoked access may continue viewing historical mailbox activity.
→ May expose operational or sensitive mailbox information depending on the audit log contents.
→ Indicates inconsistent server-side authorization checks, increasing the risk of similar access control issues elsewhere in the application.

Remediation → Perform server-side authorization checks for every audit log request.
→ Validate the user's current permissions before returning mailbox-related logs.
→ Return 403 Forbidden when the user is no longer authorized.
→ Ensure audit log access follows the same permission model as the underlying mailbox resource.
Proof of Concept (PoC) Google Drive Link: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1c3fthnH3Vfq60bd4RacM3_aHF8zgmw88?usp=drive_link

Conclusion The application fails to properly enforce server-side authorization on mailbox audit log resources. Although mailbox access is removed from the user interface after permission revocation, previously generated audit logs remain accessible through direct requests using known log IDs. This represents a Broken Access Control issue because authorization is not consistently enforced on the backend.

Thanks

The application is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) on the notification "Seen" endpoint. An attacker can craft a malicious HTML page that silently triggers the notification "seen" request from a victim's browser while the victim is authenticated.

Because the endpoint accepts the request without validating a CSRF token or verifying the request origin, the victim's notification status is changed without their knowledge or consent.

Although this does not expose sensitive information, it allows unauthorized modification of user data, violating the integrity of the victim's account.

CVSS v3.1 → Score: 4.3 (Medium)

Steps to Reproduce

1. Login to Attacker Account (Account A) using Firefox.

1. Navigate to Notifications.

1. Ensure at least one notification is available.

1. Enable Burp Suite Intercept.

1. Click Seen on a notification.

1. Capture the request.

1. Send the request to Burp Engagement Tools.

1. Generate a CSRF PoC.

1. Modify the generated PoC by changing:

method="POST" to method="GET"

1. Save the HTML file.

1. Login to Victim Account (Account B) using another browser (Chrome).

1. Ensure the victim has at least one unread notification.

1. Open the generated CSRF PoC in the victim's browser.

1. Click Submit Request.

1. Observe that the victim's notification is automatically marked as Seen without the victim performing the action.

Actual Behaviour

1. The notification is marked as Seen in the victim's account simply by visiting and submitting the attacker-controlled HTML page.

1. No CSRF protection, Origin validation, or SameSite-based mitigation prevents the request.

Expected Behaviour

1. The server should reject any state-changing request that does not contain a valid CSRF token and should verify the request originates from a trusted source.

1. Only the authenticated user performing the action from the legitimate application should be able to mark notifications as Seen.

Impact

1. Unauthorized modification of notification status.

1. Attackers can manipulate notification state without user consent.

1. Users may miss important notifications because they appear as already read.

1. Demonstrates missing CSRF protection on a state-changing endpoint.

1. Indicates other sensitive endpoints may also be vulnerable to CSRF.

Business Impact

1. Loss of integrity of user account data.

1. Important alerts, security notifications, or business messages may be marked as read without the user's knowledge.

1. Reduced user trust due to unauthorized account actions.

1. Reveals a security control weakness that could affect higher-risk endpoints if the same protection is missing elsewhere.

Remediation

1. Implement anti-CSRF tokens for all state-changing requests.

1. Validate the Origin and Referer headers.

1. Use SameSite=Lax or preferably SameSite=Strict for session cookies where appropriate.

1. Ensure endpoints that modify data only accept the intended HTTP method (e.g., POST) and cannot be invoked via GET.

1. Follow the Synchronizer Token Pattern or another robust CSRF defense mechanism across the application.

Video Proof of Concept:

Google Drive link → https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1v9Y7TFbgv-FFztKX23aL_ZNkDu3GCqWT?usp=drive_link

Conclusion

The notification "Seen" endpoint lacks proper CSRF protection, allowing an attacker to force authenticated users to unknowingly mark their notifications as read. While the immediate impact is limited to unauthorized state modification, it represents a clear integrity issue and indicates that CSRF protections may be absent from other state-changing endpoints. Implementing standard CSRF defenses will prevent unauthorized cross-site requests and strengthen the application's overall security posture.

Thanks

This is a follow-up to my security report ( FS #363 ) (cross-tenant file disclosure via the
shared /tmp on SSH/web hosts: files created with the default umask landed
world-readable (0644) and were readable by other tenants on the same host).

You made a change to the non-interactive umask and asked me to confirm it. I've
re-tested on ssh1 and can confirm it's fixed:

- umask now returns 0007 in the non-interactive case (ssh <host> umask, bash -c,
sh -c), not just interactive shells. Previously all of these returned 0022.
- A /tmp file created with the default umask is now 0660 (rw-rw—-) instead of 0644.
- My original cross-tenant test no longer works: a second account of mine, in a
different group, trying to read that file now gets "Permission denied".

Since the issue was valid, reproducible, and cross-tenant before the fix, I'd like to
request a small bounty for the report, at your discretion.

Thank you,
Sayada Zannat haque

Severity: High
CVSS 4.0 vector: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N`
CVSS 4.0 score: ~8.2 (High)
Target: `ssh-<account>.alwaysdata.net` (physical SSH host `ssh1`) and the web-application hosts (`http21`) — kernel `6.18.30-alwaysdata`
Type: CWE-668 (Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere) / CWE-732 (Incorrect Permission Assignment) / CWE-200

Description

 `echo "SECRET_OF_A" > /tmp/canary_A.txt`

Impact

Remediation

Register a new account using Email and Password.
Do not verify the email address.
Log out of the account.
Select Sign in with Google.
Authenticate using the same Google account associated with the registered email address.
Observe that the application sends the following notification: A (Google) OAuth connection has been configured on your profile.
Follow the OAuth authentication flow.
The application redirects to: /oauth/google/callback/
Observe that the endpoint returns: 404 - Page Not Found
Open a new browser session and attempt to log in using the original email and password.
The application still requires email verification before allowing password-based authentication. Observed Behavior • Google OAuth successfully links to the account before email verification is completed. • Email/password authentication continues to require email verification. • OAuth callback results in a 404 response, indicating an incomplete or inconsistent authentication flow. Expected Behavior The application should verify ownership of the registered email address before permitting external identity providers (such as Google OAuth) to be linked with the account, unless this behavior is explicitly intended. If OAuth login is intended to satisfy email ownership verification, the application should consistently mark the account as verified and complete the authentication flow without errors. Security Impact Depending on the intended authentication design, this behavior may result in: • Inconsistent authentication state. • Improper account-linking logic. • Potential bypass of email verification requirements. • Confusion regarding account ownership validation. • Increased attack surface if account-linking validation is not consistently enforced. Although I did not observe direct account takeover during testing, the current behavior indicates that the account verification and OAuth linking processes may not be consistently enforced. Recommendation I recommend reviewing the OAuth account-linking workflow to ensure that: • Email ownership verification is consistently enforced before linking external identity providers, or • Successful OAuth authentication is explicitly treated as verified email ownership and the account state is updated accordingly. • OAuth callback endpoints are correctly configured to prevent unexpected 404 responses. • Account verification logic remains consistent across all supported authentication methods. Conclusion The observed behavior suggests an inconsistency between the traditional email verification process and Google OAuth account linking. Reviewing the authentication workflow and enforcing consistent account verification logic will help reduce the risk of authentication-related issues and improve the overall security posture of the platform. This report is submitted under responsible disclosure. I would be happy to provide any additional information or assist with validation if required. Kind regards, Cyber_Subhash

Log in as an account administrator.
Invite a new user with only the Billing Contact permission.
Log in using the Billing Contact account.
Navigate to the user or team management section.
Observe that the Billing Contact user is able to access the Invite User functionality.
Successfully initiate an invitation for another user. Expected Behavior A user assigned only the Billing Contact role should be restricted to billing-related operations and should not be able to invite or manage additional users unless explicitly intended by the role design. Actual Behavior The Billing Contact role is able to invite new users despite being intended for billing-related access. Security Impact If this behavior is not intended, it may allow: • Unauthorized user invitations. • Expansion of account access without administrator approval. • Circumvention of role separation. • Violation of the Principle of Least Privilege. • Increased risk of unauthorized account access. The overall impact depends on the permissions that can be granted to invited users. If elevated roles can be assigned, the security impact could be significantly higher. Recommendation To mitigate this issue, I recommend: • Restricting the Invite User functionality to administrative or dedicated user-management roles. • Reviewing role-based access control (RBAC) permissions to ensure Billing Contact users are limited to billing operations only. • Enforcing server-side authorization checks for all user management actions. • Verifying that non-administrative roles cannot perform account management functions unless explicitly intended. Conclusion The observed behavior suggests that the Billing Contact role may have broader privileges than expected by allowing user invitations. If this is not intended behavior, restricting user management capabilities to authorized administrative roles would improve the application’s access control model and better align with the Principle of Least Privilege. This report is submitted under responsible disclosure. I would be happy to provide additional information or assist with validation if required. Kind regards, Cyber_Subhash Security Researcher

I hope you are doing well.

I would like to responsibly disclose a security issue identified in the password reset functionality of your application. During testing, I observed that the application returns different responses for registered and non-registered email addresses, which allows an attacker to determine whether a specific email address is associated with a valid user account.

Severity:Medium

Category: Information Disclosure / User Enumeration

Description

The password reset endpoint responds differently based on whether the submitted email address exists in the system.

When a registered email address is entered, the application returns a successful password reset response. However, when an unregistered email address is submitted, the application returns a different error message indicating that the email address does not exist.

This behavior enables an attacker to enumerate valid user accounts by submitting multiple email addresses and comparing the application’s responses.

Steps to Reproduce

Navigate to the **Forgot Password page.
Enter a valid, registered email address.
Observe the success response indicating that a password reset email has been sent.
Repeat the process using an email address that is not registered.
Observe that the application returns a different response indicating that the email address does not exist.
Compare both responses and note that they reveal whether an email address is registered.
Proof of Concept

Registered Email

Email: registered@example.com

Response:
"If an account exists, a password reset link has been sent."
Unregistered Email

Email: randomuser@example.com

Response:
"Email address not found."
The difference in these responses allows an attacker to identify valid user accounts.

Security Impact

An attacker can exploit this behavior to:

Enumerate valid user accounts. Identify registered email addresses. Facilitate targeted phishing campaigns. Support credential stuffing or password spraying attacks. Gather intelligence for further attacks against identified users.

Although this issue does not directly expose user credentials, it increases the effectiveness of subsequent attacks by revealing valid account information.

Recommendation

To mitigate this issue:

Return the same generic response regardless of whether the email address exists. Use a consistent HTTP status code for both scenarios. Ensure response bodies, headers, and response timing are as similar as possible. A recommended response is:

“If an account exists for the provided email address, a password reset email will be sent.”

This approach prevents attackers from distinguishing between registered and unregistered email addresses.

Conclusion
The password reset functionality currently discloses account existence through differing responses. Standardizing the application’s responses for both valid and invalid email addresses will effectively prevent user enumeration and improve the overall security posture of the application.

I am submitting this report under responsible disclosure and would be happy to provide any additional information or assist with validation if required.

Kind regards,

Cyber_Subhash Security Researcher

However, the current implementation for alwaysdata.com is incomplete and improperly configured, rendering DNSSEC ineffective and exposing the domain to potential exploitation.

Findings: Upon detailed analysis of the domain’s DNS records, the following issues were identified:

Unsigned DS Records: The Delegation Signer (DS) records in the parent zone are not correctly signed, breaking the essential chain of trust required for DNSSEC validation. Properly signed DS records are necessary to ensure the integrity of DNS queries.

Invalid RRSIG Records: Several Resource Record Signature (RRSIG) entries in the DNS zone are invalid, indicating key management or signing process failures. These invalid signatures compromise the authenticity and integrity guarantees provided by DNSSEC.

DNSKEY Mismatch: A mismatch exists between the DNSKEY records in the domain’s DNSKEY RRset and those provided in the delegation response from the parent zone. This inconsistency weakens the DNSSEC chain of trust, making the domain susceptible to tampering.

Steps to Reproduce:

Navigate to the DNSSEC debugging tool: https://dnssec-debugger.verisignlabs.com

Enter the domain alwaysdata.com for analysis.

Observe the red-highlighted errors indicating DNSSEC misconfigurations and missing or invalid DNSSEC records.

Impact: Due to these misconfigurations, the domain ballerina.io is vulnerable to several security risks, including:

DNS Cache Poisoning: Attackers can inject forged DNS responses, redirecting users to malicious sites.

Man-in-the-Middle Attacks: Without valid DNSSEC validation, attackers can intercept and alter DNS responses.

Domain Impersonation: Weak or broken DNSSEC allows attackers to impersonate legitimate services under the domain.

Data Tampering: DNS records could be modified, leading to data leaks or loss of service integrity.

Reputation Damage: A compromised DNS configuration undermines user trust and damages the organization’s credibility.

The application https://admin.alwaysdata.com/login/ does not validate the number of active sessions per user, allowing multiple concurrent logins without any limitations. Additionally, the application fails to notify users when a new session is initiated from a different location or device. This issue poses significant security risks, especially in areas handling sensitive data, such as admin panels or personal user accounts.

Steps to Reproduce:

Login from Device A :

Navigate to https://admin.alwaysdata.com/login/ Enter valid credentials and log in.
Login from Device B :

Using a different device or browser (e.g., mobile phone or another computer), navigate to https://admin.alwaysdata.com/login/ Log in with the same user credentials used in Step 1.
Verify Active Sessions:

Observe that both sessions remain active simultaneously.
Note that the application does not notify the user about the new session from a different location/device.
Actual Behavior:

The application allows multiple concurrent sessions for a single user account without any limitations.
No notifications are sent to the user when a new session is initiated from a different location or device.
There is no mechanism to monitor or manage active sessions within the user account.
Expected Behavior:

The application should limit the number of active sessions per user to enhance security.
Users should receive notifications when a new session is initiated from a different location or device.
A session management page should be provided, allowing users to view and terminate active sessions.
Impact:

Non-Repudiation Risks : The lack of session notifications and limitations can lead to unauthorized access and actions that are difficult to dispute.
Increased Vulnerability : Multiple concurrent sessions increase the risk of unauthorized access, especially if one of the sessions is compromised.
Remediation:

User Notification : Notify users when a new session is initiated, especially from a different location or device, to raise awareness of active sessions.

Session Management Page : Provide users with a dedicated session management page to view and terminate active sessions for enhanced control.

IP Address Tracking and Restrictions :

Track the IP addresses associated with each session and flag any suspicious activity, such as multiple logins from different locations.
Allow users to specify trusted IP addresses or ranges, restricting session initiation to known and approved locations.

Expected Behavior: The MTA-STS record should be correctly configured and published in the DNS records for the domain [Domain Name]. It is essential for secure email communication and enforcing TLS encryption for all incoming and outgoing email traffic.

Steps to Reproduce:

Navigate this url https://easydmarc.com/tools/mta-sts-check and enter your domain name alwaysdata.com

Observe the absence of the MTA-STS record in the DNS response. No record was found, indicating that the MTA-STS record is not present in the DNS configuration.

Impact: The absence of an MTA-STS record leaves the email infrastructure vulnerable to various security risks, such as downgrade attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, and interception of sensitive email content. Without the MTA-STS mechanism in place, email communications may be transmitted over unencrypted channels, compromising the confidentiality and integrity of the data.